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ABSTRACT
The Boston and Sandwich Glass Company closed its factory in 1888 after a bitter 
labor dispute.  This study focuses on the perception of the workers by the press, 
Sandwich citizens, and themselves.  The history of the union was similar to others in the 
nineteenth century.  It began as a local organization and eventually joined the American 
Flint Glass Workers’ Union, a national organization.  Press coverage of the labor crisis
tended to focus on the well-being of Sandwich as a community, generally blaming the 
AFWGU and the Manufacturers’ Association for meddling in local community affairs.  
The workers and the company did not tend to be assigned responsibility for the crisis.  
Later authors tended to write about the incident as it was viewed in the popular memory 
of Sandwich.  They generally portrayed the event as it was covered by the press, 
sympathizing with workers and blaming Pittsburgh interests for the downfall of the 
company.
This thesis aims to tell the story of the Sandwich glass workers and their union, 
and how the union played a crucial role in the collapse of the glass industry in the town.  
More specifically, it tries to explain how the union viewed itself and its changing status, 
and how the larger Sandwich community saw the workers, and how they were key factors 
in the crisis.
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1INTRODUCTION
Perception is an important part of life.  How a person or group of people is 
perceived can affect their actions, and it obviously influences the way others treat them.  
Many factors help in the formation of our perceptions of other human beings.  What 
someone looks like, where they are from, the work that they do, or how they speak are 
just a few examples.  Perception, however, is not rigid, and under the influence of outside 
forces, how a group of people is viewed can change over time.  In the United States of the 
nineteenth century, great changes took place.  Industrialization, commercialization, and 
urbanization came over the country like waves – and just as a wave can carry a person 
safely to shore or smash him on a rock, these transformations took people with them to 
prosperity or poverty.  Skilled workers were viewed as more valued members of society 
than the unskilled, but often that was the only distinguishing factor.  Skilled workers had
to protect themselves against falling down the social ladder.  Men and women who built 
comfortable, if not extravagant, lives for themselves and their families saw their jobs 
move to new regions.  Some occupations even disappeared with the advent of new 
technology.
The focus of this study is on one such group of people.  In 1888, Sandwich, 
Massachusetts, had been a center of glass production for over sixty years.  Glassblowing 
required a great deal of skill and the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company paid the men 
who performed that task quite handsomely.  Throughout the 1880s, though, firms based 
mostly in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, made inroads into Eastern markets and threatened the 
economic lives of the citizens of Sandwich, who all relied heavily on the factory for their 
2well-being.  Some workers decided to head west in search of better jobs with higher pay 
and more security.  Others decided to stay in Sandwich and try to weather the storm, 
hoping that they could continue their lives there somehow.  
To that end, many of the skilled workers joined the glassmakers’ union.  Workers’ 
associations had existed in Sandwich for several decades, but the most important union 
was the initial organization with a national scope.  The American Flint Glass Workers’ 
Union (AFGWU) first formed in 1876, and by 1879 it reached the Cape Cod village.  The 
following ten years were marked by labor strife and the declining importance of 
Sandwich to the glass industry.  The final crisis came early in 1888, when, fearing 
another strike, the company locked the glassmakers out of the factory.  They would never 
be allowed to make glass for the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company again because the 
directors voted to close rather than give in to the union’s demands.
The perception of the workers is the central theme of this study.  That perception 
differed depending on how one looked at them.  The company, union leadership, the 
press, the local community, and the workers themselves all had different points of view
on the labor crisis at hand.  The experiences of these groups affected how each viewed 
the members of Local Union 16 of the AFGWU, and thus influenced the outcome of 
events.  These questions form the basis of each chapter.  The first will delve into the 
history of the glassmakers’ union in the Sandwich and the social lives of the workers, 
seeking to answer the question of why they organized into a union.  What kind of life 
were they trying to preserve?  What was their motivation for association?  Chapter Two 
will look at the coverage of the crisis in local newspapers from Sandwich and Boston.  
3How did the press portray union members and their activities?  How did the company and 
the directors come across?  The final chapter will look at books written about the 
company and the industry in Sandwich and will determine what the lasting impressions 
of the workers and the union were.  Why were these books written?  What kinds of 
sources did they use?  How did they portray the last days of the company?  What do their 
works say about how the crisis was seen in the popular memory of Sandwich?  The 
downfall of the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company is a tragic story that belongs in the 
historiography of American labor and industrialization.  
The two books that began the tradition of labor history in the United States were 
John R. Commons, et al., History of Labour in the United States and Norman Ware’s The 
Labor Movement in the United States, 1860-1895.  Published in 1918 and 1929, 
respectively, these two groundbreaking works set the standard for every author who 
followed them.  They presented in detail the economic factors that contributed to the rise 
of the labor movement generally and the Knights of Labor and trade unions specifically.  
They discussed workers as voters, wage-earners, and economic actors.  However, they 
did not examine social factors and implications of the changing economic landscape at 
length.  Workers were seen merely as cogs in the larger machine of industrialization, and 
their status as members of different ethnic communities, or as men, women, whites, 
blacks, skilled, or unskilled were not viewed as necessarily relevant to their experiences 
as wage earners and were rarely mentioned.  The notable exception is that Commons felt
that the immigrant experience and assimilation were important in the creation of 
American exceptionalism.  He did not distinguish between immigrants from different 
4areas and treated immigration itself as the key factor in their experience as workers.  The
authors also said nothing about the relationships between labor, capital, and the rest of the 
community.  Only later, beginning in the 1960s, would these social factors come into 
play for historians.1
One of the earliest American historians to address such issues was Herbert 
Gutman.  In his various works, such as the essays collected in Work, Culture, and Society 
in Industrializing America, he confronted social questions directly.  He claimed that his 
purpose was to examine “the ways in which the behavior of working people affected the 
development of the larger culture and society in which they lived.”2  Of particular interest 
to him was the attitude of non-affiliated community members towards labor activity.  
That is, he wanted to investigate how individuals who were not industrial wage earners or 
owners of large factories reacted when factory workers went out on strike.  He found that 
generally smaller communities were more willing to support striking workers against 
management than their big-city counterparts.  This was due to the close relationship
between workers and their community.  In large urban areas townspeople were not as 
connected to most of the industrial workers, and they had other industries to fall back on 
in the event that one segment of the economy fell into disarray.  Even if the other 
segments of the population in smaller communities – including shopkeepers, farmers, and 
                                                
1 John R. Commons, et al., History of Labour in the United States (New York, 1918) and Norman J. Ware, 
The Labor Movement in the United States, 1860-1895: A Study in Democracy (New York, 1929).
2 Herbert G. Gutman, Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-
Class and Social History (New York, 1976) p. xii.
5laborers – were not entirely sympathetic with the workers’ plight, they understood that 
the loss of a factory or shop could devastate a town.3
The relationship between factory workers and the larger community, especially 
those who could be considered social elites, is of vital importance to the study of any 
labor struggle.  The perception of workers by elites, and how the workers feel they are 
viewed, shapes both groups’ actions.  Many working-class individuals made it their life’s 
work to attain middle-class status and respectability, despite the common prejudices of 
people already in that class.  Oftentimes those efforts came at the expense of another 
group, such as unskilled workers, new or different immigrants, or those with darker skin.  
Gutman pioneered the study of these relationships and found that they had perhaps the 
greatest influence on labor struggles.  He also pointed out how elite perception of those 
underneath them was distorted by ethnic and class bias.  These distortions often showed 
themselves in the observations of newspaper editors and journal writers.  This forces 
historians of the present to look at accounts of class relationships and events, such as 
labor crises, with a critical eye.  It is imperative to try to see through prejudice and ask 
why elites viewed workers and the working-class the way they did.4
An important addition to the literature came in 1961 in the form of Gerald N. 
Grob’s Workers and Utopia: A Study of Ideological Conflict in the American Labor 
Movement, 1865-1900.  Grob introduced the conflict in American labor between reform 
and trade unionists.  Like Gutman’s work on the attitude of the local community, these 
concepts are central to the study of Sandwich.  Reformists were those workers who 
                                                
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
6wished to establish a society of small producers and generally did not embrace the wage 
system.  They viewed relying on a paycheck from a boss (or “master”) as denying oneself 
independence.  Self reliance was the benchmark of citizenship in America since the early 
days of the republic, dating back to the idea of a nation of small, independent farmers.  
During the era of industrialization that notion fell by the wayside, but the idea of 
independence did not.  The National Labor Union of the late 1860s and early 1870s had a 
reform agenda.  After that movement failed, the Knights of Labor also incorporated much 
of that ideology into their organization, such as the establishment of cooperative ventures 
and a resistance to strikes because of their implicit recognition of the wage system.  Grob 
even mentions the disparity between what the AFGWU wanted and what its supposed 
parent organization, the Knights, fought for as early as 1886.5  
The Knights of Labor were investigated further in Leon Fink’s Workingmen’s 
Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politcs.  Fink provides four case studies 
on the Knights, and how the organization mobilized workers politically.  He also offers
details about the public attitude toward labor at the end of the nineteenth century, saying 
that as unions became more militant, people began to distrust them.  He points to 1877 
and the violent events of that year’s Great Strike as the turning point, but indicates that 
matters only worsened throughout the 1880s and 1890s, peaking with the Haymarket 
Square incident in which eight policemen were killed by an anarchist’s bomb in 
Chicago.6
                                                
5 Gerald N. Grob, Workers and Utopia: A Study of Ideological Conflict in the American Labor Movement 
1865-1900 (Evanston, IL, 1961).
6 Leon Fink, Workingmen’s Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics (Chicago, 1983).
7In 1995 another work appeared that attempts to describe the downfall of the 
Knights and the switch to trade unionism.  In Industrializing America: the Nineteenth 
Century, Walter Licht maintains that Samuel Gompers and his followers – eventually 
including the glassmakers – left the Knights after he became disenchanted with Terrence 
Powderly’s leadership.  Powderly was much more of an idealist who focused on 
principles instead of bettering the lives of workers. The focus of Licht’s work was that 
terms such as urbanization and industrialization are often vague and not nearly as 
descriptive or accurate as they need to be to portray the dramatic changes that occurred in 
the nineteenth century.  He proposed that the real change in America was a rise in 
commercialism, and the permeation of that concept across all aspects of life.  Gompers 
and his followers viewed Powderly’s announcements as naïve, the strikes endorsed by the 
power structure as quixotic, and the movement into politics as foolish.  The skilled 
workers of the United States were being held back by the masses who were allowed to 
join the Knights, and as a result workers such as Gompers formed their own, more 
exclusive union.  The need for a strong union was critical for these artisans as a matter of 
economic security.  Gompers and his followers were worried that by allowing blacks, 
women, and perhaps most importantly unskilled workers into the union, they were 
hurting the cause overall.  Skilled workers would never be able to achieve respectability 
or middle-class status if they were not accepted by social elites and that would never 
happen if they continued to associate with socially undesirable groups.  In essence, to 
8achieve a more privileged social status, Gompers felt it was necessary to be more elitist 
when considering potential union members.7
During the 1980s and 1990s numerous monographs were produced describing 
various industries and towns and how they changed over the course of the nineteenth 
century.  Several focused on New England towns.  One of the earliest such studies was 
Mechanics & Manufacturers in the Early Industrial Revolution by Paul G. Faler.  His 
description of the shoe industry in Lynn, Massachusetts, and the social implications of 
industrial and commercial changes is a model for similar micro-historical works.  He 
made several observations that can also describe the situation in Sandwich and other 
industrial towns.  As he traced the history of shoemaking in Lynn from the early republic,
Faler noticed that masters and journeymen had once been united by their interests and 
only separated by ownership and command of capital.  The two groups worked side-by-
side in small shops until the middle of the century.  Shop owners were no longer 
craftsmen; rather, they were merchants or others not directly involved with production.  
Manufacturers started making large profits and living more extravagantly.  This 
withdrawal from the workplace and lavish lifestyle were really what drove workers and 
their bosses apart.8
Other notable works include Jonathan Prude’s The Coming of Industrial Order: 
Town and Factory Life in Rural Massachusetts, 1810-1860, and Daniel Vickers’, 
Farmers & Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-
                                                
7 Walter Licht, Industrializing America: The Nineteenth Century (Baltimore, 1995).
8 Paul G. Faler, Mechanics and Manufacturers in the Early Industrial Revolution: Lynn, Massachusetts, 
1780-1860 (Albany, NY, 1981).
91850.  These books, published in 1983 and 1994 respectively, provide other examples of 
the drastic changes that occurred in the lives of workers in the Bay State during the 
nineteenth century.  Instead of glass, these authors focus on textiles, farmers, and 
fishermen.  Prude also examines rural industrialization in south-central Massachusetts, 
helping refocus the view of historians away from urban areas.9
One important study focused not on an industry in a small town, but the rise of 
industry itself in the nation’s largest city.  Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise 
of the American Working Class by Sean Wilentz details the economic and, more 
importantly, social changes wrought by the development of industrial production during 
the first part of the nineteenth century.  Perhaps the most important contribution of this 
work is Wilentz’s concept of the “bastard workshop.”  The term refers to the rise of what 
are also called “manufactories” or industrial centers that used little to no labor-saving 
technology.  Instead of investing in expensive and potentially unreliable machines, 
Wilentz points out, manufacturers broke down the production process into increasingly 
small units that required ever decreasing amounts of skill to perform.  This turned 
workshops, once the bastion of the proud, skilled artisan, into places where common 
laborers performed mindless tasks for a pittance.  This reduction of necessary skills, 
along with the creation of larger factories that made use of machines, reduced the level of 
job security for industrial workers.  The abundance of available labor during the period 
was part of the impetus for the growth of unions.  Such an organization provided a 
                                                
9 Jonathan Prude, The Coming of Industrial Order: Town and Factory Life in Rural Massachusetts 1810-
1860 (New York, 1983) and Daniel Vickers, Farmers & Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex 
County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1994).
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modicum of protection, at least for skilled workers such as glassblowers, against the twin 
terrors of “bastardization” and mechanization, which workers saw as laying siege to their 
crafts and positions in society.  If they were allowed to continue unabated, once-skilled 
workers would no longer be able to lay claim to a social standing above unskilled 
laborers.  The most relevant issue Wilentz discussed was the reactions of the workers to 
their lost status.  He showed how they viewed themselves, and how they felt they were 
perceived by manufacturers and factory owners.  Workers took action to make sure they 
remained included in the democratic process by organizing themselves into early versions
of unions and even forming a short-lived workers’ political party.  They also reacted with 
violence in some cases, taking to the streets and rioting in protest of their lessened 
status.10
David Montgomery continues the examination of this trend in The Fall of the 
House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865-1925, in 
which he also examines the nature of the relationship between workers and their 
government. Montgomery is particularly useful because the first twenty-five years of the 
period he covers are the same as those in the study on Sandwich.  A good overview of the 
labor movement after the Civil War, The Fall of the House of Labor looks at several 
industries across the country, including machinists and iron workers.  However, he makes 
some of his most important contributions in his extension of Wilentz’s concept of 
“bastardization.”  He indicates distinctions among common laborers, operatives, and 
skilled workers based on the nature of their work and their skill level.  Each type was 
                                                
10 Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City & the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850
(New York, 1986).
11
perceived differently by each other and by the non-working classes.  Practicing a skilled 
trade was seen as being a productive member of society, while many common laborers 
were viewed contemptuously.  Laborers worked in construction and mining as well as 
other physically intensive occupations, while operatives toiled in factories, utilizing the 
latest industrial technologies.  Obviously skilled workers maintained the highest wage 
levels and had much more leverage in negotiations with capital.11
Montgomery, like many of the other authors discussed above, focuses on how the 
workers perceived their loss of status as factories mechanized and broke down traditional 
shop techniques into unskilled tasks.  They were threatened by this, viewing their 
positions as fragile and easily subverted.  Workers so feared social diminishment that 
they organized into strong unions and attempted to slow, if not halt, further technological 
advancement.  Unions were also used to try and prevent jobs from going to new 
immigrant groups or unskilled laborers.  Union members were aware of their position in 
society and how other social classes, particularly elites and the middle-class, viewed 
them.  Montgomery shows how workers and unions tried to advance their social position 
in his discussion of the iron workers union of Pittsburgh.  The union charter made clear 
that members were to behave in decidedly middle-class ways, and that respectability was 
one of the key goals they were to achieve through the organization.
Montgomery provides important context for the Sandwich workers and their 
union.  The factory in Sandwich employed each type of worker described in The Fall of 
the House of Labor; men who stoked the fires of the furnaces to melt the glass were 
                                                
11 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: the Workplace, the State, and American Labor 
Activism, 1865-1925 (New York, 1987).
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laborers, pressmen and some of the girls in the decorating department were operatives;
and glass blowers were skilled craftsmen.  He also notes that in discussing the labor 
movement in America, historians must be attuned to many different voices, be they 
racial, ethnic, gender, or regionally based.  This is crucial to the study of Sandwich 
because of the significance of the workers in and around Pittsburgh, and what their 
experiences and interests were.  They were not necessarily the same as those of the 
workers in the East.  Montgomery also points out that some of the strongest bonds of 
solidarity, an important working class concept, were those of local neighborhoods.  
Montgomery’s focus on social factors picks up where Herbert Gutman left off, in 
examining ties between workers and their communities, and at the same time it helps 
explain the actions of workers who were unwilling to move west in the hopes of better 
pay.  
In his examination of iron puddlers and machinists, Montgomery discusses the 
workers’ code of ethics and conduct, which would eventually become the foundation of 
the constitution of their union.  These rules closely resemble those of the glassmakers, 
such as the concept of “manly bearing” and the treatment of fellow workers.  The 
constitution of the Sons of Vulcan was written in 1866, at the same time as the first 
statewide glassmakers’ protective association was formed in Massachusetts.  Skilled 
crafts unions also managed to define for themselves what constituted a reasonable days’ 
work and how the craft itself would be governed and passed on to the next generation.  
13
These issues were important to workers, who needed a sense of control over their lives, 
and indeed, they were the very issues disputed in the conflict in Sandwich in 1888.12
Insight into the motivations of the union workers in Sandwich and an 
understanding of their conflict can be gleaned from the works of the other historians as 
well.  This study will examine some of the press coverage of the crisis in Sandwich to 
gauge the level of public support received by the workers, the union, and the company.  
The section of the study dealing with the press will keep Herbert Gutman’s work in the 
background to determine how Sandwich fits in with his thesis about the difference in 
community support in small and large industrial towns.
The American Flint Glass Workers’ Union was affiliated with the Knights of 
Labor for the first decade and a half of its existence, but left to join the fledgling 
American Federation of Labor shortly after the events described in this study.  Members
identified much more closely with Samuel Gompers and his brand of “bread-and-butter” 
unionism as a way to achieve practical labor reforms.  The clash between reformists and 
trade unionists played out in Sandwich with some workers deciding to start their own 
cooperative glass factory.  Others decided to move on with their lives and search for jobs 
in the more lucrative western Pennsylvania and Ohio region.  The proponents of the 
cooperative movement were reform minded workers, while those who accepted their lot 
as wage-earners were trade unionists.  Gerald Grob’s work helps explain the differences 
between the Knights and the AFWGU and why the latter organization left for the AFL 
after the events of 1888.  Grob showed that there were at least two general ways workers 
                                                
12 Ibid., pp. 14, 17-20 and 204.
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saw their situation at the end of the century.  The reformists, represented by the Knights 
and the Sandwich men who founded the co-operative, saw themselves as independent 
producers who were on a par with management in the production process.  Trade 
unionists, such as those in the AFL and most of the Sandwich glassmakers, had begun to 
view themselves as wage earners and accepted a subordinate role at the workplace in an 
attempt to achieve the goals of higher wages, better conditions, and respectability.  
Reformists did not think that a subordinate man could be a respectable one, and that was 
the main difference between the two approaches.  At the same time, Leon Fink helps 
explain the change seen in glassmakers’ unions in Sandwich between 1866 and 1888.  In 
the immediate post-war period Massachusetts glass workers were intent on being 
transparent to the public, but by the time of their affiliation with the AFGWU these 
intentions were gone.  The change in public attitude probably accounts for this at least in 
part.
A parallel can be drawn between Faler’s story about Lynn and the one in 
Sandwich, although that is not the focus of this study.  Deming Jarves founded the 
factory in Sandwich in 1826, and shortly thereafter the company was incorporated.  Over 
the following three decades Jarves lost significant control and eventually left the firm to 
found the Cape Cod Glass Works.  With that the managers of the factory became 
increasingly distant from the workers and the factory, in much the same way as the 
shoemakers lost contact with their own masters.  That distance helped breed resentment,
if not contempt, among workers.  A shift occurred during this time as a result of that 
15
distance.  The glassmakers saw their position as important partners in the process 
whittled away, and unionization was an attempt to stop or even reverse that development.
Jonathan Prude’s work also presents a good parallel when examining Sandwich.  
The towns of Oxford, Dudley, and Webster are similar to Sandwich in that they were not 
large urban complexes like New York or Boston.  However, it should be noted that they 
differed from the Cape Cod town due to the existence of multiple manufacturers in each 
place.  There were many textile factories in the area, as opposed to Sandwich, which had 
only one dominant local company.  This is the main difference between Sandwich and 
other New England towns such as Lynn, Lowell, and Lawrence.  Those communities 
usually had more than one factory of importance to rely on, even if they were all 
producing for the same industry.  That fact did not stop the industries in question from 
leaving.  Just as glass production was no longer viable in Sandwich at the end of the 
century and therefore the factory closed, so too did the cloth and shoemaking industries 
leave central Massachusetts due to competition from overseas and the New South.
The uniqueness of Sandwich in this regard is the most important lesson to be drawn from 
this study.  Workers had no viable options in Sandwich after the factory closed.  If a firm
shut down in Oxford or Lynn, there were other companies to which a craftsman could 
offer his labor.  Does the one-factory nature of the town change the dynamic of a labor 
crisis?  Do the theoretical frameworks established by earlier scholars such as Gutman, 
Montgomery, and Faler stand up under such conditions?
Perception greatly influenced industrialization and how people reacted to it.  
Workers saw themselves in a number of different ways.  Some clung to the old idea of 
16
the independent small producer, while others embraced the status of wage earner in an 
effort to better their position.  Either way, unions represented a chance to protect workers 
against further subordination, degradation, and diminishment of wages and respect.  
Unions also developed as a means to maintain social standing and, as such, they instituted 
stringent rules against what was seen as disrespectful or unmanly behavior.  Perception 
was key to workers, both for how they saw themselves and how they wished to be viewed 
by other members of the community.  The press played a crucial role in shaping the 
perception of unions and workers, and in turn helped form the way events would be 
looked at in the future
17
HOW THE WORKERS SAW THEMSELVES 
The way a group views itself is forged over a long period.  To see how skilled 
glass workers in Sandwich perceived themselves and their situation, it is necessary to 
look at their past. Why did they think they needed to unionize?  Why did they seek to 
join a national union?  Were local unions unable to protect them sufficiently? The 
glassmakers were very proud, and felt that their craft and skills should be protected.  
Their union was powerful during the 1880s, and the workers became confident that their 
association could protect them from the intrusion of management.  It is also important to 
examine how they felt they were looked at by other members of the Sandwich 
community, particularly the social elites.  They tried to distance themselves from other 
workers of Irish stock in seeing themselves as more respectable, less dependent on 
alcohol, and more productive in society.  For decades, glassblowers and their skilled 
associates in the factory had been trying to form a protective association.  Those 
endeavors seem largely to have failed until the late 1860s, when glassmakers from 
throughout Massachusetts got together for protection.  That group formed the basis of 
what was to become Local Union 16 of the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union 
(AFWGU) in 1879.  By examining the constitutions of the two organizations (the 
Massachusetts Glassmakers’ Protective Association and the AFGWU), the workers’ self-
perception – and how it changed – becomes clearer.  To get an even better picture, it is 
necessary to look at the lives of the men and the people of Sandwich to determine under 
18
what circumstances the union came to be and why the workers felt it was necessary to 
unionize.
In 1866 workers in the Massachusetts glass industry formed a union to defend 
their interests.  Delegates from eight different factories in the Bay State had met the 
previous year to devise a constitution and establish rules for the union.  By the end of 
1866 the United Glassmakers of Massachusetts became fully operational.  The 
representatives from the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company were William Hobson, 
William Kern, and Thomas Dean.  When these delegates brought the document back to 
Sandwich, no fewer than twenty-nine men attached their names to it, proving that the 
principle of union was strong on Cape Cod.  The preamble to the constitution described 
the reasons why previous attempts at association among glassmakers had failed.  
Foremost among these reasons was “the inequality of those who formed them, through 
the want of an understanding of each other, in order that they may know how to govern 
the whole body.”1 In other words the men had not reasoned as a group, but rather as 
representatives from individual factories.  They had not understood, as the individuals
forming this new union claimed to understand, that “Union is Power.”  Yet the new 
union, like its predecessors would also fail to provide the security the workers sought.  
Part of the reason for this was an internal tension between reformist and trade unionist 
members.  For example, the constitution described its members as free and independent 
men who had no master, but provided that it would work toward the betterment of both 
workers and management.  Despite its lack of early impact, in Sandwich it would form 
                                                
1 Glassworkers’ Union file, Constitution of the United Glassmakers of Massachusetts, January 1865
19
the nucleus around which Local Union 16 of the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union 
would be built twelve years later.2
The people of Sandwich had long understood the benefits of association.  For 
years the glass workers had mingled with other citizens in fraternal organizations that
successfully strengthened the ties between different social groups and families of the 
community.  Organizations like the Odd Fellows, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Knights 
of Columbus, and Freemasons flourished in the tiny Cape Cod town during the years of 
the factory’s existence.  These groups had much in common with early labor unions.  
They performed a social function, allowing the members of the community and their 
families to get together.  They also acted as social safety nets, with members taking care 
of deceased or incapacitated members’ children or widows, just as the Massachusetts 
Protective Association would have done for injured or dead glass workers.  Sometimes 
pioneer unions were nothing more than “coffin clubs,” doing nothing but providing a 
wooden box for members after they died.  According to the opening statement of the 
Protective Association Constitution, there had been several other attempts to unionize 
glass workers of New England. All failed, and there is no evidence that they existed 
other than this brief statement.  But while there is little to no information on any of these 
early glass unions or why they folded, clearly it was not out of disdain for the notion of
unionization itself.3
                                                
2 Ibid., and worker cards from the Archives of the Sandwich Glass Museum
3 “Fraternity in Glass: the Independent Order of Odd Fellows and the Glass Community in Sandwich, 
Massachusetts,” The Acorn Vol. 12, 2002 p. 99
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The attitudes of workers in Sandwich changed dramatically between the post-
Civil War era and 1888.  In a mere twenty-two years the workers’ association went from 
saying it was working for the benefit of themselves and management to saying nothing of 
the sort, and seemed to  being concern itself only with gaining short term benefits.   At 
least eight individuals who signed the 1866 Preamble were present twenty-two years later 
and joined the branch of the new national union.  Still, the change in outlook was 
dramatic.  The difference between the two periods is revealed in the address to the 
working men in the earlier constitution.  There it indicated that:
An association is itself only an instrument; it requires knowledge to direct its 
action, and must depend upon the intelligence that guides it, whether it be a 
benefit or not… [The Union’s] aim and purposes are the moral, social, and 
financial advancement of every man among us, which we believe is the only true 
means of arousing confidence between us and our employers, and enabling us to 
meet them upon any question which may arise connected with the business in 
which we are engaged; and of settling matters upon terms far more agreeable and 
more calculated to promote the prosperity of each party, than by force of any 
kind. 4
The union was only a tool, and without proper guidance it could be misused.  
Without intelligent leaders, the organization would be ineffective.  The purpose of the 
union was to allow workers to meet on an equal footing with their employers in order to 
discuss all aspects of the industry, including wages, prices, and production.  The union of 
the late 1880s would fall short in all of these regards largely because of the rapidly 
changing industrial landscape.
The Massachusetts glassmakers understood the common fears of workers’ unions.  
They made their intentions clear to the public, stating that the workings of the union were 
                                                
4 Constitution of the United Glassworkers of Massachusetts and worker cards from the archives of the 
Sandwich Glass Museum
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not to be a secret and that they were “not afraid to declare their intentions to any one.”  
The glassmakers’ union would not be a hidden affair or a cabal setting out to fleece the 
public; indeed, the union charter stated that the organization sought to protect members 
and do no harm.  This shows that previous efforts at association were met with this type 
of criticism and that certain segments of the wider population, such as social elites, 
viewed unions in such a way.  The glassmakers sought to display this perception and set 
the record, as they saw it, straight.  They viewed themselves as honest and hardworking 
and felt that the public should also look at them that way.  The glassmakers tried to make 
sure the union would not be viewed as a greedy organization, claiming they wanted only 
justice, and that they recognized “the rights and claims of others,” meaning employers 
and consumers.  The new union also took the offensive, attacking the idea that it would 
be a destructive or counter-productive member of society, and pointing out a common 
double standard among people who lament “combinations” of laborers and workers, 
while applauding the “associations” of others such as the owners of the factories for 
whom they worked.5
If the testimonies of the preamble and opening statements are taken at face value, 
then it can be said that workers strove to establish a system of equality between 
themselves and their employers.  If the men were elevated to such a position, the entire 
industry in the region would be better off because each side would be protected.  The 
workers would feel more comfortable dealing with management because they would not 
have to fear arbitrary wage cuts or other major changes.  If the men educated themselves 
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in the ways of the entire business, they could understand the economics behind such cuts.  
As a result, owners would not have to fear strikes or an angry mob of ignorant workers.  
The individuals who established the protective association were not just trying to protect 
themselves or their families – they were attempting to protect the manufacturers as well.  
They understood fully that it took both sides to make the industry work.  The men who 
signed the Preamble in the late 1860s were seeking to protect their craft for future 
generations of citizens of the Bay State.
The Union was governed by a charter, consisting of fourteen articles, some of 
which were further separated into sections.  Most of the document dealt with bureaucratic 
details and was similar to other union documents of the period.  Article III, for example, 
listed the duties of the various officers from president and vice-president to secretary and 
treasurer.  Others noted requirements for entry into the Union or dues payments required 
by each factory’s local organization.  Dues could be returned to a departing member or 
the family of a deceased member, less actual expenses incurred for the organization.  The 
articles also catalogued the various ways someone could be expelled.6  
Following the constitution were the Rules of Order, which detailed the basic 
framework of each meeting of the Union.  Generally the rules explained who could ask a 
question and when, but one went farther.  Rule II stated in part that, “[n]o sectarian or 
political question shall be entertained at any meeting of the Society.”  This reflected the 
trend in early unions to shy away from politics and to focus only on issues that related to 
work and workers.  At the time, socialism and anarchism were brought to the United 
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States by European immigrants and were feared by large segments of the non-working 
classes.  Saying the organization would not become involved in politics might have been 
a way to prevent such associations for union.  This impulse also was seen in the actions 
of the Patrons of Husbandry, or the Grange, in the 1870s.  Grangers became involved 
through heavy lobbying and endorsements, but never crossed the line into becoming a 
political party.  Future unions would follow similar avenues, such as the American 
Federation of Labor and the American Railway Union, endorsing politicians whom they 
deemed to be friendly to the causes of the workingman.  Some labor groups, such as the 
various socialist organizations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
involved themselves more directly in politics, either by running their own candidates or 
through political actions against capitalism.7
Glass workers of all types were some of the earliest industrial laborers to organize 
in the United States.  Even though flint glass workers, window-glass makers, bottle glass 
producers, and other various workers had separate unions, they were bonded by almost 
identical job descriptions, wages, and working conditions.  The development of the 
unions from each segment of the industry followed parallel lines.  In 1877, the window 
glass workers’ union started on the path to national scope when the local gatherers’8
association in Pittsburgh joined the fledgling Knights of Labor as Local Assembly 300.  
Cutters, flatteners, and blowers soon followed the gatherers.  The gatherers were some of 
                                                
7 For more on the Grange see Oliver Hudson Kelley, Origin and progress of the order of the Patrons of
Husbandry in the United States: a history from 1866 to 1873 (Westport, CT 1975), James Dabney McCabe, 
History of the Grange movement, or the farmer’s war against monopolies (New York, 1969), and Solon 
Buck, The Granger movement; a study of agricultural organization and its political, economic and social 
manifestations, 1870-1880 (Cambridge, MA 1913).   
8 The gatherer took the molten glass from the pot in the furnace and did the initial blowing.
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the first workers in the industry to unite because they tended to be paid lower wages and 
have less job security.  Two years later, blowers and gatherers merged their unions as LA 
300; by the following February they had also absorbed the local cutters and flatteners 
unions.  It did not take long before the union claimed that it had successfully organized 
every window glass worker in America.  While this was an exaggeration, there is little 
doubt that the organization had blossomed and spread its jurisdiction over most of the 
window-glass making factories.  With that kind of reach the union regulated prices and 
output as well as negotiated for wages and hours.  In 1885 the union extended the 
workers’ annual summer vacation from two months to three, and in following years the 
length would be determined annually by a joint owner-worker committee.9  
During the late 1870s and early 1880s manufacturers organized to counteract the 
growing power of the union.  The Eastern Flint Glass Manufacturers’ Association was 
formed as part of this counter-movement.  Strikes in 1882, 1883, and 1884 helped to 
consolidate the power of the labor union.  Then, in 1885, the union showed the true 
nature of its reach when, in an effort to curb the influx of new foreign workers into the 
industry, it organized a meeting of world glass makers.  Representatives from Belgium, 
England, France, Germany, and Italy met with leaders from the United States and 
organized the Universal Federation of Window Glass Workers.  It is unclear if this 
federation survived for long, but the fact that workers had united globally under one 
name, even if only briefly, suggests the organizational power of glass workers’ unions.10
                                                
9 Pearce Davis, The Development of the American Glass Industry (Cambridge, MA, 1949) p. 127-130
10 Ibid., pp. 131-132
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In 1866, the same year the Massachusetts Glassmakers Protective Association 
appeared, the first attempt at national organization occurred.  Instigated by workers from 
a factory in Brooklyn, New York, the first-ever national convention of flint-lime glass 
workers gathered in Philadelphia.  This shows that the center of the industry remained the 
Eastern seaboard, roughly in a north-south axis between Boston and Philadelphia.  Local 
organizations, which were common in most Eastern glassmaking towns, sent 
representatives to the conference, but the meeting yielded no substantial results.  Twelve 
years later another convention took place in Pittsburgh where several different craft 
unions unified under the banner of the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union (AFGWU).  
The effort to nationalize the scope of organization and to affiliate with the Knights of 
Labor shows that glassmakers were beginning to view themselves as part of a larger 
movement in society. Workers from Sandwich did not join the new union at its founding, 
but before the end of the following year they became members of the AFGWU and the 
Knights of Labor.  The union organized its branches by craft.  This meant that chimney-
shade makers, pressers, centerpiece makers, and others each had their own individual 
unions under the umbrella of the national association.  Every branch had its own rules 
governing hours, wages, the apprentice system, and the length of the summer break, 
although many were similar.11
In 1879, the AFGWU arrived in Sandwich.  Local workers organized in January 
and by April they had received their union seal and constitution.  The seal read: 
“Obedience to the Majority.”  The motto of the AFGWU was indicative of how union 
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leadership viewed individual members.  While it was not a socialist or radical
organization, the AFGWU believed that what was best for the majority of workers was 
best for all workers.  The national leadership, made up entirely of Pittsburgh workers,
viewed individual members, especially those working in the East, as expendable.  Most 
of the glass workers in the 1880s lived in Pittsburgh and the surrounding area.  The best 
interests of Sandwich glassmakers were of no concern to the union.  Local Union 16 
formed from what had been the Sandwich chapter of the Massachusetts Glassmakers’ 
Protective Association (MPGA), which had been formed in the late 1860s.  At least eight 
men who had signed the MGPA Preamble were members of the later union as well; these 
included Peter Swansey, born about 1843, who was a gaffer, or master glass cutter, at the 
Sandwich factory.  For several decades his family had been associated with the 
community.  His father had come from Ireland and his brothers Patrick and John worked 
at the factory.12  
Swansey’s experience and that of his family would not have been uncommon in 
Sandwich, as fathers passed the skills of glassmaking down to their sons.  That is part of 
the reason why unionization was so prevalent in the industry, since fathers felt the need to 
protect the craft for their sons and other members of the next generation, preventing them 
from becoming laborers instead of skilled workers.  Downward mobility was a real 
possibility and it threatened the lives that skilled workers had built for themselves and 
their families.  Glassmakers, especially blowers, lived relatively comfortable lives, but 
                                                
12 Worker cards from the archives of the Sandwich Glass Museum
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their position was tenuous.  The skilled workers knew this and feared being grouped with 
unskilled laborers at the bottom wrung of the social ladder.13
The new union, like others in glassmaking towns, received a copy of the AFGWU 
constitution.  Representatives to the first national convention had conceived the document 
in 1877, so the Sandwich glassmakers had no voice regarding rules that would govern 
them in their lives as working men.  Unlike its predecessor in 1866, the new document 
came with no lengthy statement of purpose or preamble discussing the history of the 
industry or labor’s place within it.  Instead, it was simply the “Constitution of the Local 
Unions of the American Flint Glass Workers Union.”  Each identical constitution began 
with a blank line where the number of the new local would be placed, in this case the 
number sixteen.  The first article contained a straightforward declaration of objectives: 
“the elevation of the position of its members; the maintenance of the best interests of the 
Order, and all things appertaining to the business in which the members under its 
jurisdiction may be involved.”14  The union, based in distant Pittsburgh, that new center 
of the American glass-making universe, now determined what was in the best interest of 
the workers of Sandwich.  Obedience to the majority would be required, and in this case, 
that meant obedience to the whims and decrees of those in western Pennsylvania.15
Following the first article were sixteen others, discussed below.  Article II 
designated who was eligible for membership.  The document uses the term “workman,” 
which instantly excluded the many women who labored in the factory as decorators.  
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14 Glassworkers’ Union file, Constitution of the Local Unions of the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union, 
Pittsburgh, 1880
15 Ibid.
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However, any “blower, presser, finisher, foot-finisher, mould blower, prescription blower 
or gatherer” could be nominated for membership as long as he was at least eighteen years 
old and agreed to abide by the rules of the constitution and affix his signature.  The only 
other requirement for eligibility was that he be “sober and industrious.”  After an existing 
member nominated a man and he was accepted by two-thirds of the local members, he 
paid an entry fee of at least fifty cents (roughly $10.10 in 2005 dollars).  If, for whatever 
reason, the union rejected a man’s membership – and this was not out of the question, as 
it happened to Patrick Linehan and John Martin in Sandwich – all other locals were
notified and that man was not allowed to be nominated again for at least three months.  
The organization was meant for respectable craftsmen with a skill that was useful to the 
industry and society.  Anyone deemed disorderly, effeminate, or intemperate in any 
aspect of their life or work would not be allowed to join, as they would bring down the 
social standing of the other men by association.16
The locals were beholden to the national body.  Article III listed the dues of each 
member as three cents every three months, to be paid to the Secretary of the National 
Union.  Article IV noted the various officers required of each local, of which there were
twelve (a significant increase since 1866).  Article V outlined the basic duties of each 
officer.  The recording secretary had an especially interesting job within the union 
hierarchy.  He had to be ready at a moment’s notice to deliver his books and records to 
the national office for inspection and to report all matters to Pittsburgh that may have 
“interest to the trade.”  Essentially he was required to reveal the goings on of his fellow 
                                                
16 Ibid.  The AFGWU did accept Patrick Linehan two years after his initial denial.
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local members and the state of his factory so that the national union could remain 
informed of the status of the glass industry throughout the country.  It would be of 
interest to leaders of the national union to know, for example, that fuel prices or shipping 
costs had increased in a glassmaking region.  Pittsburghers could take advantage of these 
types of occurrences by positioning themselves to take over a greater share of the market.  
Also of note is one of the duties of the inspector.  He was to “receive the password” from 
anyone trying to attend the meeting.  This seemed to be a far cry from the Protective 
Association’s policy of openness and a turn to the secrecy that made laypeople unsure of 
where to stand on the labor movement.  Why would the union change switch positions so 
diametrically?  One possible answer is the influence of the Knights of Labor, which had 
started as a secret organization.  The National union dictated the new policy to Local 16, 
so it is unclear how the Sandwich workers felt about it.  The union leaders feared that 
information disclosed at public meetings could be used against them by management.  
Even private meetings could be infiltrated by company spies, so the union had a right to 
be suspicious.17
The specifics continued: Article VI laid out the procedure for electing officers 
every six months, in December and June, with the new officers replacing the old at the 
first meeting of the following months.  Article VII dealt with the installation of new 
officers.  Article VIII briefly described the two types of meetings, stated and special.  
And article IX dictated to new members that no local could to go on strike unless it met 
the standards of the National Union.  There was no hint, however, of what those 
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standards may have been.  Upon the sanctioning of a local strike by the national body the 
secretary was to write a statement of “the facts” and send it to all member unions so they 
could know what their industrial brothers faced.  Local members thus gave up some of 
their independence for the perceived extra security provided by the national body.18
Article X explained how each member of the union was to act to all others.  They 
were required to be “punctual” and attend all regular and special meetings unless they 
had a good excuse.  The union also forbade vulgarities against fellow members and from 
bringing general offense to them through personal insult or physical injury.  A first 
offence against this rule brought a warning, but subsequent instances of the “unmanly use 
of such language” would result in exile from the current union meeting.  Drunkenness at 
meetings was not tolerated.  Most offenses against the rules carried with them fines of 
varying amounts.  For being drunk, a member was charged one dollar.  The amounts
doubled for any further such occurrences.  These fines were not small by any means.19  
The workers viewed themselves as respectable members of society, and wanted their 
union to represent them as such.  They did not want to be seen as lowlifes, drunks, or 
unruly citizens in the eyes of the community.  Behavior that would cost them 
respectability was therefore punished heavily, both with fines and the prospect of 
expulsion from the brotherhood.  If the secretary failed to submit the required reports to 
the national headquarters, the national union fined him three dollars.  This indicated that 
the AFGWU valued bureaucratic efficiency as well as temperance and virtue.  Of course, 
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19 According to http://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/compare/result.php, this figure can be 
converted in several ways with dramatically different figures.  Using a comparative price index, one dollar 
in 1879 would be roughly equal to $20.20 in 2005.  Using the conversion for relative share of GDP, 
however, that same 1879 dollar would be worth $1,330.75 in 2005.
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if one assumed the duties of secretary, he would know what was expected, and was
rightly responsible for any penalties he incurred for tardiness.  But it points to the 
increasingly bureaucratic nature of the union itself, and how it seemed to care more about 
running a tight ship than helping individual workers.  It is true that a sloppy union would 
be of almost no use to members, but it is clear that what the union felt was best would 
take precedence over the well-being of a single member, or even an entire local, such as 
the one in Sandwich.20
The bureaucratic nature showed itself further in the committees that the locals 
were to establish upon admittance to the national union, described in Article XI of the 
constitution.  The previously mentioned Factory Committee aimed to guarantee the good 
relations and conduct between men while at the factory.  An Auditing Committee made
certain that the reports issued by the secretaries and treasurer were accurate and devoid of 
fraud.  These were the only two standing committees, but the union created temporary 
bodies as it saw fit.  Among these were the committee of men intended to wait for the 
return of General Manager Spurr at his office while he was away during strikes, such as 
in 1885 and 1888, and the committee in charge of preparing the annual union ball.  
Committees were used to show the orderly nature of union and workers; besides having 
specific functions, they combated the notion that they were unruly or uncontrollable and 
that they fit in neatly with the rest of the population.  The union tried its best to 
demonstrate that glassmakers were more similar to farmers (who started the Grange) and 
other respectable occupations than to lower class immigrants with which they had more 
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in common in terms of nationality or religion.  The constitution required all men to assist 
the officers and committees in any way they could, ensuring the smooth flow of business 
at every level of the union hierarchy.  This may have been an effort to demonstrate the 
professional nature of glassmaking, joining it to other occupations that were emerging in 
the late nineteenth century, such as lawyers, physicians, economists, and historians.  
Establishing such a hierarchy could have separated glassmakers from laborers without 
sacrificing any traditional rules; again, in other words, it was a way for the union to recast 
its image in the public eye without changing much at all.21
Article XII explained that each member was expected to pay dues to the union 
every month.  After three consecutive months of failing to pay, a member was suspended 
without benefits until he wrote a letter of re-application to a special committee whose job 
it was to investigate the case.  Members then took an up-or-down vote to decide their 
suspended brother’s fate after the matter appeared before the whole body of the local.  A 
simple majority and the payment of an unspecified sum of money to the union were all 
that was required for reinstatement.  The democratic nature of union locals demonstrates 
that glass workers viewed themselves as members of a republic, where each man’s 
opinion mattered as much as that of any of his peers.  This showed the rest of the 
community that if a glassmaker got out of line, the union would deal with him harshly.  
The organization would not permit such people to stay in the brotherhood, because only 
respectable men were allowed into the union.  Local members could not change the rules 
and laws of the union at their own leisure.  Amendments were only made at meetings of 
                                                
21 Ibid.
33
the national body, and even then only when two-thirds of present members agreed to any 
proposed changes.  It is unclear what, if anything, was altered in the constitution between 
its adoption by Local 16 in 1879 and the eventual collapse of the company many years 
later.  The perception the workers had of themselves as citizens and important members 
of a republic was obviously belied by the fact that they could not decide for themselves
what rules were fair for their unique local situation.22
Fraud against the union was taken seriously, as was illustrated in Article XIV.  
Any man found to have committed fraud or to have assisted another in so doing could be 
immediately discharged from the order.  If a man who was receiving union benefits while 
supposedly sick or injured was found to be gambling his compensation away or spending 
it on alcohol, he could be similarly punished.  The same went for an individual who was
discovered to be receiving benefits while actually earning a wage.  Almost four pages of 
the eighteen-page constitution were dedicated to describing what constituted fraud and 
outlining the punishments of those so charged.  This indicates perhaps that fraud was 
widespread among unions in the nineteenth century, at least common enough that large 
labor associations had to be so explicit about the problem, but also it was a way for the 
union to portray its rank-and-file as respectable citizens.  Fraud fell into the category of 
“unmanly” behavior, but it also injured fellow members financially, and thus was to be 
treated harshly.  While most men only sought to practice their craft for a reasonable wage 
and in a safe environment, obviously there were some who took advantage of the co-
operative insurance systems that unions provided in the nineteenth century.  This harmed 
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other members financially, essentially stealing paid-in dues, but also socially.  If 
glassmakers became known as a group that committed fraud and stole from people who 
were supposed to be their brothers, their status and stature in the rest of the community 
would be injured.  This was a serious matter, for with their position already rather 
tenuous, they had much to lose in reputation.23
That was exactly what the unions tried to do for their members, that is, provide a 
safety net.  Industrial work in nineteenth century American was dangerous, and more 
often than not companies did not see to it that an injured or deceased worker’s family 
received support when the breadwinner could no longer work.  Oftentimes the only way 
an injured worker could receive compensation was through the legal system, and even 
that did not work in his favor.  Under common law, industrial workers were said to have 
assumed the risk, and therefore would not be compensated for injuries.  Article XV of the 
AFGWU constitution described the benefits that a family would have upon the death of a 
loved one who was a glass worker.  Strangely, the place where there should be a figure is 
a blank line, which could mean that each member union determined locally how much it 
would pay out in benefits, or that it varied from year to year, or even that it depended on 
the job that the worker in question performed.  This was vastly different from the earlier 
version of death benefits seen in the Massachusetts Protective Association constitution.  
A family would receive the worker’s paid-in money, minus a sum for the costs incurred 
by the union itself.  This change may have been a way for the union to keep more money 
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in its coffers for strike funds, because walk-outs were becoming more frequent as the 
century drew to a close.24
The penultimate article, Article XVI, contained four sections but is most 
important because it called for union members to work stridently to achieve closed 
shops25 at their factories.  Not only did it implore members to “endeavor to establish and 
make permanent the same, and use all honorable exertions to secure employment for any 
member of this Order in preference to all others,” but union members were to assist only 
one another at the workplace.  Section One of Article XVI read:
No member in any factory shall render any assistance or loan his tools to any 
workman who persistently refuses to become a member of this Order; or who 
refuses to pay up his arrears to the same; or who uses his influence to disorganize 
his fellow workmen, and make it difficult to carry on the objects of this Order.26  
This was not an open plea for intimidation of non-union workers, but it came close.  
While members were not to hurt each other at work, either physically or in terms of job 
security, it seemed that the union wanted them to undermine the standing of all 
unorganized workmen and root them out of the factory.  Solidarity seemed a long way 
off.  Solidarity among the union members was one thing, but it clearly did not extend to 
other laborers in the factory.  Union members thus not only separated themselves from 
manual laborers, but from non-union glassmakers as well.  Independent workers were not 
hated or excluded, because any skilled worker was welcome to join the organization.  But 
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until they joined the ranks of the union, they were discriminated against quite overtly.  
Unity was important in the struggle against management, and therefore any non-union 
member was seen as a threat to the well-being of members because their presence could 
damage strike efforts and the bargaining power of the union.  Skilled workers who 
refused to join the union were seen in fact as traitors and, as such, viewed as more of an 
enemy than the company itself.  These independent workers, ironically, embodied some 
of the values that the union itself espoused – independence, hard work, and self-reliance.  
The union, however, saw these men as the ultimate threat, and endeavored to eliminate 
them from the workforce.27
Article XVII, the final provision, gave powers to the local union chapters.  Mainly 
they were able to create by-laws, but only in so far as they did not conflict with the rules 
of the national union or constitution.  Following the final article was a list of the order of 
business for each union meeting.  Roll call, reading of minutes, new candidates, old and 
new business, dues and fines, and election of any new officers were the main points that 
the locals went over every month.28
Although the two constitutions resulted in similar organizations, in some regards 
they were quite different.  Most notably, the AFGWU document stressed the bureaucratic 
nature of the union.  The earlier charter seemed to be based on traditional shop rules and 
values.  These were long-established customs or rules of thumb that glassmakers lived 
by.  While not absent from the subsequent version, these rules formed the basis of the 
members’ working lives for some time, and thus appeared to have a larger impact in the 
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late 1860s.  Also, the national scope of the AFGWU may have precluded that kind of 
focus, as conventional rules-of-thumb could differ from one factory to another.  The 
efforts by glassworkers echo those of iron puddlers described by David Montgomery in 
The Fall of the House of Labor.  He pointed out that the unions often controlled many 
aspects of the process of production, such as wages and output levels.  The parallels 
between the two occupations do not end there, as the union structures were quite 
similar.29
Montgomery makes another important point when discussing the machinists’ 
union.  The workers, he notes, were beholden to certain moral imperatives, one of which 
was that they were to maintain a “manly bearing” toward each other.  This meant 
standing up for fellow employees and making certain other workers were aware how 
much one was paid so as to avoid unfair discrepancies.30  
The idea of manliness was of utmost importance to skilled craftsmen in the 
nineteenth century, though this concept was drastically changing.  Anthony Rotundo 
explains: “If a man was without ‘business,’ he was less than man.”31  What a man did for 
a living was extremely important to his social status.  Wage earners of all types therefore 
had to fight against the perception that they were less manly because they did not own the 
means of production and relied on someone else for their well-being.  This explains the 
rules against intemperance, gambling, and vulgarity found in the glassmakers’ 
constitutions, which betrayed their concern of how they were viewed by the town’s elites
                                                
29 David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: the Workplace, the State, and American Labor 
Activism, 1865-1925 (New York, 1987) pp. 17-20
30 Ibid., pp. 204-205
31 E. Anthony Rotundo, American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the 
Modern Era (New York, 1993) pp. 168-169
38
whose respect the desired.  If all glassmakers were seen as lazy, dependent drunks, their 
social standing would fall to the level of common laborers; they themselves wished to be 
grouped with skilled workers, and eventually rise to a middle-class status.  The union was 
therefore a means not only of maintaining economic security, but of social security as 
well.  The glassmakers were fighting to keep wages high, to retain their standing in the 
community, and to prevent their being grouped with common laborers, who did much of 
the work at the factory.  If the process of mechanization continued and all skill was taken 
out of the glassmaking process, blowers and other artisans would fall precipitously down 
the social ladder.  At the bottom were laborers, then the glassmakers, while at the top 
were farmers, shop keepers, and management.  By establishing and enforcing strict rules 
of behavior, the members of the union tried to separate themselves from lower class men 
who engaged in physical labor.  This was necessary largely because there was no other 
way to distinguish themselves from the laborers, who, like themselves generally 
descended from Irish stock.32
David R. Roediger discussed this concern in his book The Wages of Whiteness.  
He wrote that Irish workers struggled to ascend to the status of white, masculine, and 
middle-class, and once they were able to do that they also had to fight to make sure they 
did not backslide to an inferior position in any of those categories.  Interestingly, Gail 
Bederman pointed out in her work on race and gender that during the 1880s middle-class 
men themselves often adopted certain behaviors and actions commonly associated with a 
working-class ideal of manhood.  This seems as though it would have been paradoxical to 
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workers of the period.  At once they would have been glad to have their actions finally 
seen as masculine after decades of being derided by social elites, but at the same time 
they would have felt that their individuality and uniqueness was under attack.  That said, 
the overpowering feeling would likely have been relief, because they would no longer 
need to feel guilty about going to the pub, saloon, or boxing match because they could no 
longer be called uncivilized or unmanly for it.  While their status as skilled workers was 
being assaulted on one front, their whiteness and manhood was being affirmed on 
another.  It was no simple matter of being one and not the other, because there were many 
ways by which whiteness, masculinity, class were measured.33
Between 1866 and the 1880s, the American labor movement changed greatly.  
Immediately following the Civil War, associations were formed with the intention of 
reforming society so that the local producer would be the basis of social and economic 
organization.  The National Labor Union and the Knights of Labor both followed this 
path.  They believed that the interests of all people were the same, and they therefore 
espoused the ideal that employers and workers could work together to create a better 
society.  This type of thinking is seen clearly in the early Massachusetts Protective 
Association Constitution and Preamble.  Glass workers thought that by improving 
themselves they could also better their industry and everyone involved in it.  They also 
did not completely accept the wage system, and continued to think of themselves as 
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independent artisans rather than wage workers.  Twenty years later, however, this was no 
longer the case for most of workers in Sandwich.34
Even though the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union joined the Knights of 
Labor at its inception, it behaved more like a later trade union in that instead of resisting 
the developing capitalist structure, it fought for the immediate betterment of its members 
through higher wages and better working conditions; in fact, the AFGWU would soon 
leave the Knights to join the fledgling American Federation of Labor.  AFGWU members 
largely accepted that they were not independent workers and depended on wages 
provided by capitalists.  In this they differed strongly from the Knights.  Terrence 
Powderly, second head of the Knights, said that the organization meant to “supersede” 
the wage system, and that it was their goal to make each man his own employer.  He did 
not approve of strikes or collective bargaining, which he thought only entrenched labor 
deeper into an unjust system.  This difference represents the most likely reason for the 
departure of the AFGWU from the Knights in favor of the American Federation of Labor 
shortly after the 1888 strike.  The AFL held an ideology similar to that of the glass 
workers.35  
On the national level, the glassworkers union participated in both strikes and 
collective bargaining in an effort to bring about higher wages, price controls, and 
improved working conditions.  This represented a broad shift in American labor toward 
acceptance of the wage system and subordinate status for workers, as well as of the 
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abandonment of the social reform agenda of earlier movements.36  The American 
Federation of Labor was the key organization involved in this shift, representing unions 
such as cigar rollers and miners, among many others.  On a local level this was not 
always the case, however.  Several of the workers from the Sandwich factory launched a 
co-operative glass company.  The co-operative movement was an important part of the 
Knights of Labor agenda in the early to mid-1880s, and obviously this spirit had not died 
out completely.  The shift to trade unionism on a national level while some, perhaps 
many, local workers retained a reform-based outlook helped doom Local Union 16 and 
the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company.
The history of the union itself is an important part of understanding the strike of 
1888, but another piece of that puzzle involves the people who worked in the factory and 
made up the union.  Immigrants made up a large portion of the workers who joined the 
union.  At least nine of the twenty-nine documented signatures on the Protective 
Association Preamble in the late 1860s were those of foreign-born individuals.  Four 
others were the sons of immigrants.  The rest were either at least third generation 
Americans or the evidence is unclear.  What is clear, however, is that even though there 
was a strong anti-immigrant movement in the United States in the nineteenth century, 
glass workers of Sandwich were able to get along within their labor organization.  To 
some degree the reason for this that part of the tradition of craft unionism came from 
Europe, and, in the case of glassmakers, particularly from the British Isles.  Most workers 
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at the factory were either immigrants themselves or the children of immigrants, and most 
of those individuals had been recruited in Ireland and England, traditional centers of 
glassmaking in the Old World.  During the early nineteenth century these men and 
women helped the Boston area become a significant rival to England in the glassmaking 
industry.  These craftsmen not only brought over their expertise in the art of crafting 
objects out of glass, but also their ideas about craft solidarity, which greatly helped the 
union movement.37
Immigrants were an excellent source of labor for glass manufacturers.  In the 
early days it was mostly European glassmakers who had the requisite skills for 
establishing factories in North America.  Yet, well into the century, even well-established 
firms, including the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company, recruited foreigners for their 
skill and their lower wage demands.  Europeans could make much more money as 
glassmakers in America than they could in their home country.  Still, American 
manufacturers were able to pay them less than they would American-born craftsmen 
because European wages were much lower.  This was important because for much of the 
nineteenth century glass workers in America earned substantially higher wages than their 
counterparts in other industries.  After the Civil War, however, skilled glass workers saw 
the difference decline as their already high wages were not adjusted for post-war 
inflation.  Wages in the East tended to be lower than those in the West due to the higher 
costs of fuel once companies began using coal and natural gas that were abundant in the 
Pittsburgh and Toledo areas.  When workers learned about this, they inclined to head 
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west in the hopes of making a better life for themselves and their families.  Like their 
cohorts in other industries, particularly railroading, glass workers moved from factory to 
factory, their movements frequently the result of the regional differences in wage levels 
and other workplace conditions.  This was all much to the chagrin of Eastern employers 
who had paid most if not all of the expenses for a skilled worker to come to America only 
to learn that they were unable to keep this new hire from seeking better wages elsewhere.  
This was not always the case, however.  One author indicates that many workers did not 
learn about the potential for higher wages in the West until it was too late, and because of 
family ties or general inertia they were unwilling to move again.  Whatever the case, 
some workers left when they found out about better opportunities elsewhere, while some 
did not.  One could put this another way by saying that workers who viewed themselves 
as glassmakers first often left, while those who stayed thought of themselves as citizens 
of Sandwich first.38  
European immigrants emphasized the importance of maintaining a skill as a 
worker and not becoming relegated to the status of an unskilled laborer.  As a result, the 
union did not allow press workers to become members, as they were viewed as mere 
machine operators for a long period in the nineteenth century.  The perception was that 
pressers were different than traditional blowers because of their lack of skills.  By the 
1880’s, however, pressing had become such a dominant part of the glassmaking 
landscape that there was almost no choice but to admit pressers into the union and to 
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argue for wages equal to those of other workers.  According to the worker cards found at 
the Sandwich Glass Museum at least two pressers, John Swansey and Thomas Dean, 
belonged to Local Union 16 of the AFGWU during the 1880’s. In fact, Dean was one of 
three representatives from the factory who signed the preamble.  No doubt some of the
individuals listed as glass blowers, glass makers, or simply workers were press 
operators.39  
What this shows is that, at least in Sandwich, a factory known for its pressed 
wares, pressers were accepted as bona fide glass makers and artisans as early as 1865, if 
not before.  In Sandwich it is likely that machine operators would have been accepted 
earlier because it was one of the first glass factories to make pressed items.  After years 
of being shunned by the union, press workers were finally accepted as true glassmakers 
when it became clear that mechanization would remain a big part of the production of 
glass.  Glassmakers therefore also had to accept the idea that they were similar to other 
Irish workers in the town who performed menial, unskilled jobs.  By allowing pressers to 
join, the union clearly thus drew a line between glassmakers and everyone else in the 
factory, but it benefited the union in that greater numbers created a stronger negotiating 
position against management.40
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Glass workers were similar to other early industrial employees in various ways.  
Perhaps one of the largest unifying themes across the spectrum of labor history is the 
resistance of workers to technological innovations.  During the first eight decades of the 
nineteenth century glassworkers had benefited from increased workplace stability and a 
shortening of work hours.  These positive changes were built on the backs of labor saving 
technologies that resulted in the lessening of the skills required to be a glassmaker.  For 
years being a glass blower was a respected position because it required a high degree of 
skill to be able to manipulate the molten material and handle the special tools of the trade.  
But after the introduction of industrial pressing, the blowers’ skills became increasingly 
unnecessary.  Wages accounted for huge percentages of the glass companies’ gross 
expenditures, in some cases reaching up to sixty percent, so the press was a godsend to 
manufacturers who could hire unskilled or semi-skilled laborers at much lower wages.  
At the same time, press molds could be used many more times than could blow molds 
and the process was much quicker, which resulted in being able to produce thousands of 
identical pieces for mass consumption.41  
The factory at Sandwich used pressing at an early stage.  Deming Jarves, founder 
of the company, had been the agent for the New England Glass Company where the 
system was first perfected in America.  The use of the press allowed Jarves to set up a 
large glass house employing around sixty men instead of just a handful of master 
blowers.  At first blowers and other traditional glass workers shunned pressers as 
unskilled laborers, who did not enjoy the respect of craftsmen and unable to command 
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the same wages.  By the 1880s, however, the once-spurned press workers had become 
welcome, and probably necessary, components of the AFGWU.42
Like all industrial enterprises, glassmaking was undergoing a great deal of change 
during the post-Civil War period.  These changes affected employees of the Boston and 
Sandwich Company and their union.  Traditionally there were about four to six workers 
involved in making a piece of glass.  This group was known as a shop.  Positions within 
shops sometimes went by different names, but generally the jobs were as follows: the 
gatherer took the gob of molten material from the pots in the furnace on the end of a long 
blowpipe.  The servitor did most of the preliminary work, shaping the piece in a general 
way.  The middle boy reheated the glass.  The batboy added small pieces that were 
difficult to craft such as handles.  The head worker or gaffer did intricate shaping work.  
The taker-in boy received the finished piece on a wooden handle and brought it to the 
lehr where it moved slowly across a conveyor belt from an area of high temperatures to 
one of much lower temperatures that resulted in a sturdy piece of glass.  Then the item 
might go to the decorating department, which was broken down into etching, engraving, 
and cutting sub-departments.  Etchers put items in acid baths after placing a wax pattern 
over them that would subsequently be burned into the surface.  Engraving entailed the 
digging of pictures into the glass with small copper wheels.  Cutting, probably the most 
skilled decorating procedure and the one most often done by men, involved scoring deep 
geometric designs into the glass using large wheels made of iron.43  
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The factory did not just employ people who worked directly on the glass articles 
to be sold to customers.  Other individuals were necessary to keep the company operating 
on a daily basis.  There were obviously clerks who kept track of payroll and orders, 
coopers to make vessels for shipping, engineers to keep the furnaces working properly, 
and pot makers to construct the large pots in which materials were melted down in the 
initial glass-making process.  Along with young children, people who held these positions
were not considered for union membership, for, again the association tried to differentiate 
between glassmakers and other workers.  Clearly a clerk or a barrel maker did not fall 
into this category.  Decorators were also excluded for a number of reasons.  First, many 
were young women, and one of the purposes of the union was to maintain the manly 
behavior of its members.  Second, although cutters were allowed, since they were skilled 
craftsmen who worked with a traditional set of tools just like the blowers, other 
decorating jobs fell more into the category of operator; the union did finally allowing 
press workers to join, but they would not extend the invitation to other operators who 
only finished products but did not create them.44
Around 1870 many glass houses began experimenting with new ways to organize 
the traditional shop in order to become more cost effective.  The shop system was 
changed so that multiple blowers would be used on each finished piece of glass, which 
meant that gaffers lost a good deal of authority over the small groups of workers.  Instead 
of shops being headed by a gaffer or master blower with several people working under 
him, shops instead were composed of several blowers, each of whom worked on one 
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specific part of each item and reported to the plant manager.  The result was an increase 
in overall worker output.45  
This is an early example of what would come to be called Scientific Management 
and, later “Taylorism” after Frederick Winslow Taylor.  Each blower would do a specific 
job on a part, meaning he lost the ability to create a whole piece on his own.  Blowing 
still demanded skill, but the set of skills required of a glassmaker diminished on an 
individual level.  Other important innovations included changes in the design of furnaces 
and ovens to make better use of certain fuels and the introduction of a cheap and effective 
formula for lime glass.  The Sandwich factory had long made flint glass products.  Flint 
had been used in the formula for the molten glass and resulted in a particularly shiny 
item.  But flint was expensive, so manufacturers had been trying for years to invent a less 
costly formula that resulted in similar end products.  Lime glass resembled flint, but it 
was made with lesser quality materials that cost less.  Lime also hardened much faster 
than flint which effectively forced the workers to speed up and produce more goods in 
the same amount of time.  The union endeavored to protect the workers against speed-ups 
and over production, which workers viewed as harmful to the industry because it led to 
lower prices, they saw their position deteriorating.  They feared that they would become 
obsolete, and that the lives they had built for their families destroyed.  All the changes 
taking place in the factory caused no small degree of anxiety among workers, which 
understandably provided greater impetus to join the union and keep it strong in the face 
of potential adversity and transition.  When the company tried to institute such changes, 
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union members saw these innovations not just as an assault on the traditions of their 
industry but an assault on how they perceived themselves.  For they saw themselves as 
skilled workers maintaining the institutions their fathers handed down to them, and hence
any changes to those institutions, like the make-up of the traditional shop or the way a 
batch of glass was composed, they viewed as assaults on the manhood and character of 
the workers themselves.46  
The glassmakers in Sandwich thus found themselves in a fight against the Boston and 
Sandwich Glass Company, but also against the glass industry itself.  The company had to 
do whatever it could to stay competitive at a time when that was becoming increasingly 
difficult to do so while paying high wages to skilled workers.  The directors desired to 
take back control of their business, which ruffled the feathers of the union members who, 
for a long time, had set most of their own rules at the factory.  Having founded the union 
to help them in that fight, they came to feel that not even a mere union could save them –
they needed a bigger organization, comprised of multiple factories, and eventually, the 
entire industry.  The union was formed out of fear.  The men were afraid their factory 
would close, forcing them to relocate.  Without an organization to protect them they 
worried that the company would take advantage of them, cut their wages, and possibly 
even hire replacement workers.  Were that to happen, it would mean that they would lose
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their middle-class standing in the community, and with that the respect of their fellow 
citizens.
51
HOW THE PRESS PERCEIVED THE WORKERS AND THE UNION
What did the other members of the community think about the glassmakers?  The 
answer may lie in the press coverage of the 1888 strike.  Over thirty years ago labor 
historian Herbert Gutman wrote that industrial workers in small towns were viewed not 
as agitators as they often were in cities, but as individuals and as valuable members of the 
community.  Gutman generally wrote about mid-western railroad and frontier towns, 
which contrast sharply to the coastal New England village of Sandwich.  It cannot be 
assumed that the citizens of Sandwich supported the members of Local Union 16 of the 
AFGWU in their dispute against the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company in 1888, or 
during other similar conflicts throughout the period.  Without diaries or letters of non-
glass workers, it is difficult to judge the attitude of the population.  However, local 
newspapers can be used to gauge the feelings of those who relied on the factory indirectly 
even if they were not glassmakers.  Newspapers do not exactly mirror the attitudes of 
local citizens, but they do reflect and influence those feelings and therefore are valuable 
in gauging public sentiment.1
For the purposes of this study, “public,” “community,” and “Sandwich citizens” 
all refer to people who did not work at the glass factory, were white Protestants, and 
owned a farm or mercantile business in town.  Those were the people whose families had 
resided in the town since it was founded in the seventeenth century, and thus were its 
most established, respected citizens.  While the glass workers were part of the community 
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and citizens, they were distinct from the upper echelons of the social strata in Sandwich 
at the time, and those are the people whose perceptions the union members cared about.  
In view of its consequences – the strike resulted in the permanent closing of the factory 
and the economic devastation to the town of Sandwich – how was the strike covered by 
the press?  Did the coverage of that strike by local newspapers demonstrate sympathy for 
the workers and/or vitriol towards the directors and management of the factory?  How 
was the story presented in metropolitan news outlets? What does that say about this 
attitude toward the strike and those affected?  
An examination of several publications from Cape Cod reveals that the stories 
about Sandwich were nearly identical.  The Sandwich Observer, Yarmouth Register, and 
Barnstable Patriot are interchangeable because the articles were the same.  They likely 
shared reports in an effort to save money.  Columns on the crisis also appeared in the 
major Boston dailies – it was, after all, the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company and the 
firm’s main offices had always been located in the capital city.  General Manager Henry 
Spurr gave an interview to the Boston Herald regarding the incident during the early 
weeks of the dispute and a few days later that paper featured a rebuttal by the union 
representatives.  The Boston Globe also included several items regarding events in 
Sandwich.  Other relevant articles appeared in the Boston Journal.  These pieces will be 
explored and compared to the local coverage to see how local and metropolitan 
perception of the crisis differed.2
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Also of value are the numerous unpublished sources available in the Sandwich 
Glass Museum.  Those records include newspaper clippings which lack dates or the name 
of the publication from which they came.  Nevertheless, they remain useful for the 
purposes of gauging the public’s perception of the events at the factory.  They are 
especially vital for the examination for the years prior to the crisis of 1888 when the 
union and the company struggled for control of the factory.
Several events had significant press coverage.   One was the naming of Henry 
Spurr as factory general manager in 1882.  Spurr was employed by the corporation for 
many years as an agent or salesman; he was a loyal company man who was also well 
respected by the workers in Sandwich.  In 1883, the year after he became general 
manager, he was given the title of general superintendent, replacing Sewell Fessenden.  
At this point he had greater control over the factory than anyone since the founder
Deming Jarves.  Spurr sought to change the way the factory operated.  He knew that there 
had been complaints about working conditions from the men. Glass making was a 
dangerous job in those days, and so he ushered in new safety measures to ease their 
minds.  He also changed the direction of the plant’s output.  For several years the Boston 
and Sandwich Glass Company had been producing products for the mass market using 
pressing machines.  This process enabled the manufacturer to make thousands of 
identical pieces quickly, but the items produced lacked the attractiveness of the older, 
handcrafted creations that had made the company famous.  Spurr desired to limit output 
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and increase product quality, according to one newspaper clipping, he got rapid results, 
the price of company stock jumping from $50 per share on April 5, 1884, to $63.25 three 
weeks later.  The previous year the people of the town – who were mostly company 
employees– awarded Spurr a gold-headed cane for being the most popular man in the 
community.  He and his wife had moved to Sandwich to be near the factory, and the men 
recognized his contributions to the company’s revival and, as a result, their own fortunes.  
George T. McLaughlin, the same individual who would later spearhead the efforts to 
keep the factory open after the strike, headed the committee responsible for awarding 
Spurr his attractive gift.  The local press sang his praises and the reports of Spurr’s efforts 
and early success in reasserting the firm’s place in the glass industry were optimistic, as 
they were cognizant of how much the fortunes of the town were tied to the company’s
success.3  
One of the earliest labor issues Henry Spurr faced was the question of the annual 
summer vacation.  Traditionally all workers at glass houses throughout the country had
received a break during the hottest months without pay.  The length of this off period
differed from factory to factory, however.  With the establishment of the AFGWU in 
1876 came an effort to standardize conditions at all glass houses, and when the workers 
in Sandwich joined as Local Union 16 in the early months of 1879, they brought the 
Boston and Sandwich Glass Company into the struggle.  The company had some 
objections.
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In the summers of 1883 and 1884 the fight over the length of the vacation came to 
a head.  Earlier in the year union men had warned that they would be taking six weeks off 
instead of the usual two.  Spurr responded that if the men did not return on schedule, he 
would go to the board of directors.  This seemed a far cry from the “happy and earnest 
union of capital and labor” that was reported to have existed under Spurr’s leadership in 
July 1882.  According to one report the local men felt that the traditional two weeks were 
sufficient, but the national union body was forcing them to stay out longer despite good 
wages and a lack of complaints regarding management.  Although glassblowers remained 
out, other factory departments continued working on previously made pieces.4  At the 
same time any blower who wanted to work was used to paint houses in Jarvesville, the 
section of town where many of the glassworkers lived in company-owned duplexes.  The 
unknown reporter who reported this detail concluded that this proved that “corporations 
have souls.”  While this was not necessarily the case, it shows that the newspaper was 
trying to portray the firm in a positive light.  The company’s actions here can be 
variously interpreted – if the townspeople turned against company management, the 
directors might have voted to close or relocate the factory, which would have spelled 
doom for Sandwich.  The company may have just been trying to avoid more trouble or an 
exodus of workers.  It also does not say that the workers employed as painters were the 
agitators – they may have been loyal workers whom the company was trying to keep on 
its side during the dispute.  In both years the work resumed after some tense weeks of 
                                                
4 The decorating, etching, and cutting departments were largely made up of young women around the age 
of twenty.  These women were not allowed to join the union.  
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idleness, and in 1884 the men returned to improved working conditions, as Spurr had 
used the time to make improvements to the factory.5
In 1885 there was yet another incident between the union and factory, occurring 
in October.  The Cape Cod Item reported that Manager Spurr blamed the national union 
for inciting the strike and indicated that there was a conspiracy afoot, saying “It is the 
general opinion among manufacturers that the strike in the East has been inaugurated in 
the interest of Western manufacturers.”6  This was also the first time when the president 
of the AFGWU, a Mr. Smith, paid a visit to the tiny Cape Cod town.  The Boston Daily 
Globe revealed that strikers claimed that the stoppage was “entirely” in the interests of 
the Eastern glass houses as well as those in the West.  The paper, however, quoted a 
worker who opposed the strike as saying that the walk-out was brought on at the 
instigation of the Western glass workers with aid from the Western manufacturers with 
the expressed intent of harming their Eastern counterparts.  If the Eastern firms closed for 
an extended period, then their customers would have to go elsewhere for glass – namely, 
the West.  In response to this and other reports of a conspiracy, a reader known only as 
“Glass Blower” wrote to the Globe.  “What is gained by the Western manufacturer by the 
great supply of coal in the West is lost in traffic or goods and places him on a level with 
the Eastern Manufacturer,” he said.  The paper may not have given the name of the 
worker for a number of reasons.  Perhaps it was unknown, or the editors were trying to 
protect him.  Or perhaps there was no worker at all, and the Globe was trying to steer 
                                                
5 Unpublished documents of the Sandwich Historical Society, Spurr family documents at the Sandwich 
Glass Museum
6 Unpublished documents of the Sandwich Historical Society, reprinting of the Cape Cod Item’s story in 
the Glass Club Bulletin found in clippings in the Union file
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public opinion toward favoring management to ruin the union.  The paper’s coverage of 
the crisis was generally hostile toward labor, so this interpretation would make some 
sense.  If the position of the union was undermined, the strike might not last much longer, 
setting back the labor movement in the area.  If the editors of the Globe viewed unions as 
dangerous or malicious, this move would help damage the credibility of labor.7
The Cape Cod Bee ran a story at the start of the strike on October 13, 1885, 
indicating that of the 275 total factory employees only 44 belonged to the AFGWU.  The 
article claimed that if space were available, both union and non-union workers would 
have their stories told.  It then took up about half of a column reprinting a posted 
response to the strikers’ demands by the Eastern Association of Flint Glass 
Manufacturers.  Altogether the article and the response by the manufacturers consumed 
approximately two thirds of a column in the paper.  The decision to provide one side and 
not the other demonstrates what the editor of the newspaper thought was important for 
readers to know.  The response by the Eastern Association of Flint Glass Manufacturers 
presents the case for management thusly: the price of glass products had slipped 
dramatically in recent years without an accompanying drop in workers’ wages, in fact 
those wages had gone up.  Workers in other industries such related to glass making such 
as materials and fuel had seen a drop in wages along with a drop in the price of their 
products.  It was unfair for workers to demand higher wages or lower production output 
when the companies are making all time low profits.  Also, freight rates are low from 
regions where fuel is abundant and cheap (Western Pennsylvania and Ohio), allowing for 
                                                
7 “Manager Spurr’s Statement,” The Glass Club Bulletin, October 16, 1885 from the Spurr family file at the 
Sandwich Glass Factory and The Boston Daily Globe, Oct 15, 1885
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ruinous competition from those parts of the country which, combined with the actions of 
the workers in the strike, could easily result in the wholesale transference of the entire 
industry to that part of the country.  That being the case the manufacturers felt it 
necessary to resist the strike and requested that the men return to work at the old wages or 
else the fires in the furnaces would go out and the crisis would be prolonged.  The paper’s 
account was obviously slanted.8
On October 20, 1885, an article appeared in the Observer citing the gloomy 
prospects at the factory.  The workers were said to be standing firm, willing to return to 
the old prices “under no circumstances.”  They were attempting to equalize wages 
between the East and West glassmaking districts.  Western firms were able to pay higher 
wages because their operating costs for fuel were less than their counterparts in New 
England and the New York area.  At that time, raising the wages of the workers in 
Sandwich would have hurt the company.  There was little the manager or directors could 
have done short of moving the entire concern to the West because workers themselves 
were mobile.  Newspapers were flush with reports of such-and-such a glass worker, 
formerly of the local factory, now employed by some other manufacturer.  These stories 
tended to be sentimental, pointing out how long the worker in question had been with the 
company, and any good things he may have done for the firm or in the community.  The 
reports showed the increasingly sad state of the industry in Sandwich, even without 
expressly saying so.  While most of the workers preferred to remain in Sandwich where 
they had roots and family ties, many did not.  When the New England Glass Company, 
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owned by Edward Drummond Libbey, relocated to Toledo, Ohio, it took about one 
hundred of its Cambridge-based artisans with them.9
If the striking workers were stubbornly sticking to their demands for higher 
wages, their opponents were just as stubborn in their refusal to accede to those demands.  
A reporter noted that the Eastern Association of Flint Glass Manufacturers met in 
Brooklyn, New York, and voted unanimously to put out the fires in the glass furnaces.  
This was a serious threat, for the fires took several days to reach the proper temperature 
for the creation of molten glass, and once they were extinguished, it meant that 
management was prepared for a long battle.  The manufacturers had obviously 
determined that the strike was not going to end quickly, and it was no longer prudent to 
continue burning fuel while the workers were idle.  All of which was an indication to the 
community that the town may be in for some rough times.  While the article did not
necessarily blame workers or directors, but it did present the situation as a kind of last 
resort for the company.10
The October 20 article ran a series of rumors after the author’s own piece in the 
newspaper.  Included among the rumors were reports that several other glass works, 
                                                
9 For more on Libbey and the move to Toledo see Warren C. Scoville, “Growth of the American Glass 
Industry to 1880,” The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 52, No. 3 (Sep. 1944) pp. 212, notes that glass 
workers tended to move around more often than their counterparts in other industries such as steel making.  
Also see Kenneth M. Wilson, New England Glass and Glassmaking (Corning, NY 1972) p. 233 and Laura 
Woodside Wathieu, Cambridge Glass (Boston, 1930) p. 38 which says that not only did Libbey take 100 
men along with him to Ohio, but that one of them was Andrew Long, the president of the union at the New 
England Glass Company.  Sandwich Observer, October 20, 1885
10 Sandwich Observer, October 20, 1885.  Fuel was one of the highest fixed costs incurred by the 
production of glass, especially if the company burned coal.  Coal had to be imported from a distance, 
usually Pennsylvania or West Virginia.  During the 1880s the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company 
waffled between coal and wood a few times because of the expense of coal.  Wood was generally abundant 
on Cape Cod, which is why the factory was built there in the first place.  Because the fires took so long to 
reach a high and ideal temperature, putting them out would be foolish during a short labor dispute.
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including those in New Bedford, Somerville, and Cambridge, had already drawn the fires.  
The article also revealed that the company had been operating at a loss and was
borrowing money in order to keep workers employed.  This pro-management report 
contrasts greatly with another report, which took a decided pro-labor angle, that many of 
the workers would rather labor in Sandwich for less money than go somewhere else.  
This may explain in part the difference between the New England Glass and the Boston 
and Sandwich companies. One was able to move west with many of its workers while the 
other could not, due to financial constraints or lack of managerial imagination.  Perhaps 
the difference in the workers’ willingness to move was reflected in the fact that 
Sandwich, a lovely town at the base of Cape Cod, was more alluring than Cambridge, a 
more urban and expensive setting close to Boston.  If so, the small town nature of 
Sandwich ultimately contributed to the decline of the glass industry there.  On the other 
hand, several lines later in the report it is said that certain workers expected to find new 
jobs easily in the West, so not everyone was attached to Sandwich to the same degree.11  
The reporter also told readers of the good feelings on both sides of the dispute. 
Spurr is noted to claim that his employees are the best and most hard working he had ever 
encountered, while the workers themselves seemed to have nothing but respect and 
admiration for their manager.  Further, the article indicated that workers found “no fault” 
with Spurr’s leadership.  Spurr is the one they negotiated with regarding their demands 
and he was the one who represents the company at the meetings of the manufacturers’ 
association.  The reporter himself acknowledged that Spurr is the one making the 
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decisions by saying that the board of directors praised his actions regarding the strike.  
The Observer reporter played up the nature of labor relations because he did not want 
word to get out that any trouble existed at the factory.  It seems to have been a public 
relations ploy to keep the public uninformed about the true feelings the parties had for 
each other.12
The Sandwich Observer reported dourly that all departments were closed except
the decorating room and that the report in the Boston Journal that the men had returned to 
work was, in fact, false.  Toward the middle of the crisis, on November 3, the Observer
made the following commentary:
The Glass Workers: To all outward appearances the situation in regard to the 
strike at the Boston and Sandwich Glass Works remains practically unchanged.  
The factory is lying at a stand still.  The only department now running is the 
decorating room.  The manufactured glass is being sold rapidly and at the same 
time more orders are continually being received but under the existing 
circumstances cannot be filled.  Monday, Mr. Spurr had not returned from his 
Western trip whither he had gone on business for the corporation.  We are given 
to understand that a committee from the local union intends waiting on him as 
soon as he arrives with the idea of making some compromise.  We do not expect 
the workmen to return to work at the old prices, neither do we believe the 
company will accept the new list.  A Somerville workman says that the men 
feared that the Union would not support them, but said they would know all about 
it if they received their money this week; but if they did not receive it, the strike 
could not exist without their support, and the strike would be at an early 
termination.  Whether the above holds good here, we cannot say.13
This article says a lot.  First, this piece reveals that General Manager Spurr had 
gone to the West on business.  In an earlier story the public was informed that he 
intended to stop at Pittsburgh to meet with area owners.  This is important because it 
shows that Spurr was out of town at an important time for the factory.  He could not 
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negotiate with Local 16 from “the West,” be it Brooklyn, Pittsburgh, or California.  He 
was the principal representative of the company to the workers, and without his presence 
virtually no progress could be made.
The second important piece of information gleaned from this newspaper report is 
the catalyst of the strike – prices.  When a glass house changed its price, it had to alter the 
wages of the men as well.  Workers, especially blowers, were paid either by the piece or 
by the move, which was simply a group of pieces of varied size depending on the items 
made.  If the company lowered the price of its goods by increasing production, wages of 
the workers would inevitably decline.  In fall 1885, the union sought to force a new “list” 
or set of rules and prices on the company.  This was going on in every glass factory in the 
East, but not those elsewhere.  The Pittsburgh and Ohio area firms reaped significant 
benefits resulting from increased orders, as consumers who needed glass products turned 
to new producers during the strike.
The final piece of information is that the men were willing to compromise.  This 
means one of several things.  It could be that the workers were broken and were only at 
that point willing to concede certain points to the company.  Since the strike did not end 
for another two weeks, it is possible that the men were not broken, but rather just wanted 
to return to work after almost a month away from their benches.  It was unclear exactly 
why they became willing to compromise, but the following week, however, no progress 
had been made and employees were asked to remove their tools from the factory until the 
end of the crisis.  The newspaper also reported that there was a meeting of the board of 
directors about which it speculated that a decision would be made to either close the 
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factory until the spring or decide to hire non-union employees.  On November 24, 1885, 
the Cape Cod Bee announced the end of the strike: “We honestly believe the workmen 
feel better in than out of the factory.  They certainly look happier.”  No reason was given 
for this sudden increase in morale other than the return to work.  The paper was trying to 
portray the workers as happy within the confines of the factory in order to give the 
impression that they had no more complaints with their conditions or pay, and at the same 
time to vilify the union for keeping the men from doing what made them happy.  Is it a 
coincidence that a short time after a possible shutdown of the factory appeared in the 
local paper the men returned to work?  Perhaps this is true.  They also could have been 
scared of losing even more time from their jobs with strike funds wearing thin, and 
finally gave in to the demands of the company.  Whatever the reason for the strike’s end, 
the Bee indicated that it was especially difficult on local businessmen and their families
who had no strike fund of their own at any period and had no direct part in the labor 
dispute.  The Bee’s concern here seems less its support of the company that the fact the 
continued operation of the factory boded well for the shopkeepers and other citizens of 
the town not employed by the company.  Any partisanship on the people’s part seems to 
have been put aside in favor of practical solutions, for should the factory stay closed, the 
entire town would be left without a source of economic wellbeing.14
On November 17, 1885, the Cape Cod Bee and the Sandwich Observer printed 
identical reports detailing the termination of the strike.  For several days before the 
official end Henry Spurr met with a committee of the strikers to try to resolve the crisis.  
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The reporter indicated that he was unable to determine exactly what took place at these 
meetings, but he believed that it was “probable that concessions were made on both 
sides.”  The workers were said to be happy to return on the terms agreed upon, 
demonstrating that they really only wanted to practice their crafts, and that they were just 
as worried about the strike as the townspeople must, especially given the difficulty of 
having to survive on meager strike funds and assistance from their brothers in the western 
districts.  Spurr, the writer of the article concluded of his behavior throughout the strike, 
“has shown no little patience.”15  
Once again Henry Spurr was presented as an admirable man who had done his 
best to preserve the company and at the same time look out for his employees.  And 
again, local workers are all but absolved of any responsibility they bore for the situation 
in Sandwich, quitting “in accordance with orders from the National Glass Workers’ 
Union and because the Eastern manufacturers had refused to accede to a new list of 
prices furnished by the union on what are known as Opal Dome Shades.”16  The 
newspapers portrayed workers as obedient cogs who had followed the orders of the 
national union.  When the conditions of the two sides were discussed after the strike, 
journalists said that while the company sustained heavy losses, losing business to 
operating firms and not being able to manufacture new products or fill new orders, the 
men who were out-of-work were said to be in a much worse situation.  These operators 
had not been paid for the preceding six weeks.  There was obvious sympathy for the men, 
                                                
15 Cape Cod Bee, November 17, 1885 and Sandwich Observer, November 17, 1885
16 An opal shade dome is an item made at the factory, which made many beautiful lamp shades.  The 
dispute seems to have arisen in part because the men wanted the company to produce fewer of them and 
charge a greater price.
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especially those who were “put out of work” by the incident, pointing to the many 
employees who were not union members who were nonetheless negatively affected by 
the actions of Local 16.  Non-union workers had the greatest public support.  They were 
seen as individuals just trying to get by with their daily lives without meddling in the 
affairs of others and causing trouble, as the union and the company could have been seen 
as doing.17
All of these reports demonstrate that when trouble began in fall 1887, it was not 
without precedent.  Labor difficulties had existed for all of Henry Spurr’s tenure as 
general manager and superintendent and in prior years.  They also seem to show that the 
animosity between the men and the company did not extend to Spurr.  The union was 
more than willing to meet with him to discuss a compromise on the pressing issues, and 
the men obviously respected him for what he had done to improve the factory.  The 
reporting of the earlier strikes was not heavily slanted toward labor or management.  
They focused more on the well-being of the community, which both parties reportedly 
valued.  Supporting the interests of the town as a whole ensured the continued readership 
of a wider audience, because it was a cause that everyone could endorse.  As the strike
wore on, reports grew increasingly desperate, mirroring the mood of the community.  
Events were particularly hard on local residents who were not employed at the factory.  
These people depended on the income from glass blowers and would struggle financially 
when that usually steady influx of cash ceased.18  
                                                
17 Cape Cod Bee, November 17, 1885 and Sandwich Observer, November 17, 1885
18 According to Harriot Buxton Barbour the glass blowers, while well paid, were also typically not savers.  
She characterizes them as big spenders who did not think too much about the future.  Readers should take 
that with a grain of salt because her book was written in the 1940s.
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Likely the saddest part of this final report on the strike of 1885 is the assurance 
given the paper’s readers that this walkout, when all was said and done, was a positive 
thing.  The agreement that was reached by Spurr and the union would lead to many years 
of labor peace and continued economic fortune for Sandwich.  A glass worker who was 
enthusiastic about the future of the company and his and fellow workers’ security and 
well being is quoted as saying, “The strike thus ended is a benefit to both the company 
and men and will be the means of preventing any further troubles at these works.”  In 
fact, as it turned out, three years later the town would be dealt its heaviest blow when the 
firm ended production, sold the factory building, and evicted workers from the company-
owned housing in Jarvesville.19
The press never explicitly reported negatively about the workers or the company, 
and especially not about Henry Spurr.  Instead, journalists attempted to put the blame for 
the crisis on the national union.  Despite the refutations from the union men themselves,
the Observer continually contended that there were agitators from the West forcing the 
Sandwich men to stay out of work even if they were happy.  Due to the high instance of 
labor disputes during the period it is obvious that the Sandwich workers were not happy, 
and the AFGWU, based in Pittsburgh, could not have done much to prevent the members 
of Local 16 from returning to work if they had so desired.  On the other hand, the paper 
was correct in saying that the union sent instigators to the town to stir up trouble, one 
being Michael Owens from Toledo.  The paper’s focus on the outside agitator, it would
seem, came not from a desire to alienate either side in the dispute, because doing so could 
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damage the town.  Eventually Owens himself rose to a managerial and ownership 
position after helping to invent a mechanized bottle making process, but in the 1880s he 
was a strong union man and came to New England to incite battles between labor and 
capital.  The strikes he helped to provoke eventually caused the closing of many Eastern 
firms, including the B&SGCo.  Ironically, he also triggered the labor troubles at the New 
England Glass Company in Cambridge, which in 1888 relocated to Toledo.  In 1895 
Owens and Edward Drummond Libbey, owner of the NEGCo, formed a partnership as 
the managers of the Toledo Glass Company that went on to have great success in the 
early part of the twentieth century and later years.20
There was little news in 1886, save that the pay schedule changed.  That year the 
Massachusetts General Court stipulated that factory workers must be paid on a weekly 
basis, instead of monthly or biweekly.  The Boston and Sandwich Glass Company in 
September instituted the change “following out the spirit and letter of the law.”  This was 
reported with decided indifference, showing only that the company obeyed the laws of 
the land, nothing more.  1886 was a slow year for news regarding the glass factory in 
Sandwich.  The following two years, however, would more than make up for it.21
The first prominent news to come out of the factory in 1887 was that the 
decorating department was going to be improved.  No word was given as to what exactly 
this meant, or what was the problem with the department in the first place, only that the 
changes would “assist greatly to the convenience” of the workers.  This meant two things.  
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21 Sandwich Observer, September 21, 1886
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First, the department needed improvement in the eyes of management.  Second, the 
company felt that the cost was worth the investment.  That decade was financially 
difficult for the company, so the fact that they were willing to spend money showed the 
community that they were still dedicated to it.  The people who worked as decorators 
were mostly young women between the ages of school and marriage, trying to earn a 
modest living.  They labored under the supervision of Edward Swann, an Englishman 
who was reputed to be an exceedingly caring overseer.  According to one account, he 
managed to keep his decorators well paid for girls, although the exact figures always 
remained a secret.  That they were reportedly “well paid” may be why females in the 
decorating department were considered to have the most enviable occupations in the 
factory open to members of their sex.  Although women could not be union members, 
this story is representative of the relationship between management and workers.  Swann, 
like Henry Spurr, cared about the conditions his workers encountered and sought to 
improve them when possible.  The press supported this paternalistic view.  The workers’ 
status as dependent was thus reinforced, even that of the skilled male glass blowers.  
They relied on the company for their own well-being and livelihoods.  This may have 
been a factor in the change from a reformist agenda to that of a trade union.22
In April, the decorating department reopened, with an account of the reopening
running in the April 5 edition of the Observer.  The next weeks were tumultuous for the 
town and the factory.  The infamous “Nicholas Black Affair” occurred the following 
week.  Since Black’s move was counted several pieces short, and his pay was docked 87 
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cents. In other words, he was accused of not producing his fair share of goods.  A move is 
a certain amount of pieces created during a turn.  A turn is a period of time consisting of a 
half days work, or five to six hours depending on what year one is referencing.  A work 
week consisted of 11 turns, or five and one half days for a union worker during the 
1880s.  The number of pieces per move depended on the size and complexity of the item.  
That day Black was working on salt cellars, which were very small and required many 
individual items to fill a move.23  Black was a member of Local Union 16, and his union 
brothers attempted to stand up for him by threatening to strike.  Unfortunately, the exact 
pages of the Observer regarding the Black Affair from the week the incident occurred are 
missing from the microfilm.  Therefore, it would be difficult to determine reactions.  The 
next edition of the paper, however, spoke to the resolution of the problem being 
“amicably settled in Boston” at a meeting between Henry Spurr and the president of the 
national union, William Smith.  The following day all discontented glass makers reported 
to work.  Residual anger, however, would linger in the hearts of the men for the 
remainder of their tenure at the factory, contributing to the nastiness of the strike the 
following winter.24
The factory made few headlines through the summer, except for the usual talk 
about the summer vacation.  Then, at the end of November, there were ominous signs 
that, in retrospect, foreshadowed the labor strife that was to engulf Sandwich in the 
months to come.  Terrence Powderly, the president of the Knights of Labor, resigned in 
                                                
23 For more on moves and turns see Dr. James S. Measell, “Turn, Move, and Wages: Key Concepts in the 
American Glass Tableware Industry,” The Glass Club Bulletin Spring/Summer 2005 edition, p. 11-17 
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24 Sandwich Observer, April 5, 1887 and April 19, 1887
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the wake of the backlash against organized labor that followed the Haymarket Square riot 
in Chicago signaling the downfall of the once great organization.  The glass unions had 
been associated with the Knights, although as strong craft unions they would eventually 
shift their allegiance to the still young American Federation of Labor.  At the end of 
December the Boston Journal reported news out of Pittsburgh, that some of the flint glass 
workers there were getting ready to open several co-operative glass factories in Ohio.  At 
the same time there was a series of major railroad and coal strikes in Pennsylvania, 
specifically along the Lehigh Valley Railroad.  Then came the most worrisome news for 
the people of Sandwich that the local union had held a secret meeting to discuss the new 
rules posted in all glass factories by the National Association of Flint Glass 
Manufacturers, which represented firms from New England to Ohio.  No one knew what 
had been discussed at the meeting, but the public was reassured that there would probably 
not be a strike.  Manager Spurr, at least, said he did not expect a walkout just as he did 
not expect the new list and rules to be totally accepted.  Spurr was hopeful that the affair 
could be settled “amicably by a committee from both organizations,” meaning the labor 
union and manufacturers’ association.  The press’s interest indicated that Sandwich
hoped so as well.25    
On January 2, 1888, the glassmakers took their tools home and went on strike – or 
were locked out, depending on the source – which showed that the optimism displayed by 
Henry Spurr and the local press was misplaced.  The next day the Observer reported that 
the entire town was in a state of depression.  Every flint glass firm in the country was 
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closed.  After the last major strike the manufacturers had reached an agreement to lock 
out non-striking glass houses if any one particular member’s workers struck, effectively 
blurring the line between strike and lock out.  In Sandwich, the crisis could probably be 
more accurately described as a lock out.  Workers demanded that the new rules be 
changed, but instead of giving in to those demands, the directors decided to shut the 
factory and extinguish the fires.  “We have closed our factories rather than alter [the new 
list],” declared one director.  Unlike in 1885, furnace fires were put out immediately in 
preparation for a drawn-out labor battle.  After the first day the Boston Globe reported 
that all glass workers were members of the union, but that definitely was not the case.  
Regardless of the inaccurate description the newspaper properly attributed a great deal of 
power in the industry to the union, for prices and production numbers had for years been 
made in part by union demands.26  
The posting of the new list of rules by the manufacturers greatly agitated the 
union.  The first rule was the most burdensome, namely that the manufacturers were 
asserting the right to hire and fire as they saw fit, thereby denying the union the closed 
shop that all labor organizations sought.  According to the Globe, the union also objected 
to the new list of prices and output numbers and the proposed new wages.  When asked to 
explain what he meant by saying the strike was not just about rules and numbers, a 
striking glassmaker refused.  Conversely, the Boston Herald seemed to try to give both 
sides a voice in the matter.  It reported several items that the Globe failed to 
acknowledge.  The Herald, for example, all but named the crisis as a lock out, which its 
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rival would not do, indicating, “It has been generally supposed that in the case the 
Western men went out, the Eastern manufacturers would not close their factories, but 
today this appears to be a wrong conclusion.”  The newspaper noted the planned co-
operative glass venture in Sandwich whose start up coincided with the downfall of the 
Boston and Sandwich Glass Company.  Finally, the Herald reported that workers were 
expected to give their answer to the new list on January 15, even though the company 
closed the factory prior to that date.  Some of the strikers interviewed were portrayed, if 
not as victims, then as less than willing participants in the drama.  Said one, “We are not 
the aggressors.”  The Globe, on the other hand, also misled the public about the 
background of the labor dispute, when it quoted management as saying that there was 
“rarely… trouble” with the employees.  Even though there had been trouble in 1883, 
1884, 1885, and 1887 – four out of the previous five years.  The Globe generally seemed 
to lend greater support to management through its reporting, and this case was no 
exception.  In this way the paper effectively laid the blame for the current crisis at the feet 
of the union, the only “new” addition to the equation.27
The following day the Herald continued to report from a more labor-oriented 
perspective.  The newspaper ran a story that attempted to show that glass manufacturers 
were not as united as previously thought and it indicated that there was a disagreement 
among owners and managers regarding what to do about the union’s angry initial 
response to the new list of rules.  Some felt that shutting down so soon was a bad idea, as 
a shutdown would alienate workers and harden the union’s resolve.  The Herald likely 
                                                
27 Boston Globe, January 3, 1888 and Boston Herald, January 3, 1888
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ran this story to show support to the union and reach a wider audience, including the 
large numbers of working class immigrants living in the city.  The paper quoted the 
national secretary of the AFGWU as saying that the strike would not last long because 
dissension among the ranks of the owners would prevent them from standing up to the 
union for very long.  At the time, a report from the Mt. Washington glass factory in New 
Bedford, Massachusetts, made this seem a plausible outcome.  Workers there viewed the
strike as a scheme by the western manufacturers to “compel the factories of the East to 
pay the same wages as in the West” in an effort to drive them out of business by forcing 
down their profits.  It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that a portion of the workers in 
Sandwich believed this story and started to prepare themselves for the inevitable 
permanent closing of their factory.  This would explain the rumors that suddenly 
circulated about the co-operative factory opening on Cape Cod as well as more glass 
blowers leaving Sandwich for other glass houses.  Although, as previously stated, the 
latter had been happening for some time due to higher wage rates in the West.28
On the same day that the above stories appeared in the Herald, yet another Boston 
daily, the Journal, ran the response by General Manager Spurr to the arguments being 
made by workers.  He denied that the new numbers lists were unreasonable.  At the last 
meeting of glass managers, prices and numbers-per-move had been compared, with the 
new list being the average of all of them.  As a result, some occupations would receive a 
pay increase while others would experience cuts.  Spurr argued that if Western and 
Eastern workers were paid identical wages, then Eastern firms would inevitably lose out 
                                                
28 Boston Herald, January 4, 1888
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and be forced to close or relocate, for companies like the Boston and Sandwich had to 
pay high freight rates for raw and finished products.  Thus, despite their proximity to 
major markets, eastern companies faced greater transportation costs due to long haul 
versus short haul differences.  Their Western counterparts being close to abundant, cheap 
materials such as coal and gas consequently paid less in total cost.  This, in turn, led to 
higher profits, higher wages, and lower prices in showrooms, and that meant more 
customers.29
At the end of the first week of the strike the Globe, Journal, and Herald had all 
run competing – and different – stories.  At that time the Yarmouth Register, being a 
weekly publication, also published its first article about this event.  These four accounts
differ in their content and approach, revealing opposing concerns between the competing 
Boston papers as well as an entirely different point-of-view from the local Cape Cod 
weekly.  The Globe and Journal indicated that work continued in every department other 
than glassmaking.  This would include the cutting, decorating, and shipping rooms.  The 
glassmakers had created enough in previous weeks to fill a warehouse and those pieces 
were currently being worked on to fill old and new orders that were still arriving.  The 
company employed non-union men to perform the tasks and there was enough still to be 
done that they would reportedly be busy for “some time,” as the Journal put it.30
The Herald continued to insist on referring to the crisis as a lockout, which the 
other papers were reluctant to do, probably because they did not want to alienate financial 
support from the business community.  Instead, they would not call it a strike, just “the 
                                                
29 Boston Journal, January 4, 1888
30 Boston Globe, January 8, 1888 and Boston Journal, April 9, 1888
75
troubles,” or “the affairs.”  The Herald seemed to be more realistic in its reporting as 
well, noting that the factory employed roughly seventy-five percent of the working 
people of Sandwich and that obviously the town relied almost solely on the firm for its 
prosperity.  That being said, the paper expressed a belief that no resolution of the crises 
seemed forthcoming.  The Globe also reported on the chances for an end to the crisis but 
went about it from a different angle.  In its view there would be no forward movement 
regarding the walk out unless it came from “the committee chosen from both the 
manufacturers and glassmakers now in session at Pittsburgh and not by any individual 
concern.”  Thus, as it saw things, that the strike had begun, there was nothing Local 16 or 
Henry Spurr or the board of directors could do but wait and see if the big players in the 
West could reach an agreement.  With this the Herald seemed to disagree, in that it, 
reported that while there would likely be no meeting between Spurr and the local union, 
there might be one between the manager and leaders of the American Flint Glass 
Workers’ Union.31
On January 8 the Globe carried two important items about the glass strike that 
were not picked up immediately by its rivals.  First, it reported a rumor circulating that 
the union workers would return to their posts if the company hired non-union men to do 
their jobs.  Then it printed the following report from Brooklyn, New York, the traditional 
meeting place of the Eastern Association of Flint Glass Manufacturers that “an Eastern 
manufacturer outside of Brooklyn had decided to withdraw from the association [the 
EAFGM].  This will break the combination and the men can return to work under the old 
                                                
31 Boston Globe, January 8, 1888 and Boston Herald, January 7, 1888
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rules.”  These reports seemed to indicate ways for work to resume at the factory, but 
these predictions did not come true.  Although some firms did leave the manufacturers’ 
union and make individual agreements with their labor forces, this did not result in the 
resumption of glass making at Sandwich or any other associated glass house.  And the 
B&SGCo had hired non-union men to do some jobs, although they did not make any 
glass, and this had not resulted in the breaking of the union or a return to work of any 
kind.32
The Herald consistently displayed better reporting.  The newspaper was not a 
labor organ, but its approach was fairer to both sides.  During the first few weeks of the 
strike it showed an ability to get better stories that spoke to the nature of and reasons for 
the work stoppage, something the Globe and Journal failed to do.  The Herald ran 
interviews with Henry Spurr and union representatives, allowing both sides to make their 
arguments to gain public support.  The workers claimed that Spurr historically favored 
non-union men and that he and the manufacturers’ association were attempting to destroy 
the union once and for all.  This story conflicts with all the previous coverage of the 
relationship between Spurr and the workers that indicated that it had been a positive, 
mutually respectfully one for some time.  It is not clear if the previous reports were in 
error or if subtle, subsurface tensions only sprang to life in 1888.33  
The union probably harbored resentment toward Spurr for some time, but due to 
his popularity with other workers and within the community, could not speak up 
                                                
32 Boston Globe, January 8-9, 1888.  The Mt. Washington and Meridan factories left the association that 
day or the next, giving in to the workers’ demands.  This did not change the status of the strike at Sandwich 
except to give false hope to the employees.
33 Boston Herald, January 7, 1888
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regarding his tendency to favor non-union labor.  Whatever the case, the union men were 
unhappy with how Spurr handled the strike.  They also accused him of hiding facts from 
the public and from B&SGCo stockholders.  The paper does not say what those facts 
were, but this was a clear effort by the union to try to turn the shareholders against 
management to gain an advantage in negotiations.  The Herald reported that the strike 
was an attempt by Western manufacturers to use the union and the Eastern manufacturers 
as patsies, ruining the glass making business in its traditional center of New England, 
New York, and eastern Pennsylvania.  It even went so far as to accuse the president of the 
Eastern Association, James Gillinder of Philadelphia, of being complicit in the plot, with 
the hope of moving his own concern to the Pittsburgh-Ohio district.34
Henry Spurr responded in the same paper a few days after the accusations against 
him and the EAFGM were printed.  He refused to speak to any of the statements made by 
the workers other to say that the employees referred to events that had occurred under 
previous managers, before he had taken over the plant in 1882-1883.  He flatly denied 
any wrongdoing and claimed that he showed no preference of non-union workers over 
union members.  Spurr rejected the Gillinder story, indicating that the president had 
always worked in the best interests of glass firms in the East.  The Herald did not 
editorialize on the statement, leaving the reader to decide what to think.  Of course, there 
is no telling what was left out of either report.35
Over the next weeks and months the Boston newspapers discontinued their 
coverage of events in Sandwich, save when it was voted to close the plant for good in 
                                                
34 Ibid.
35 Boston Herald, January 10, 1888
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August 1888.  The Cape Cod newspapers, particularly the Observer, ran almost weekly 
pieces regarding the strike, noting generally that no progress had been made on a 
resolution.  In early February President John Parker died, which was seen as a bad omen
for the factory.  Events in Pittsburgh were followed closely with the hopes that something 
would be done; namely that one side would give in to the other’s demands or that a 
compromise could be reached.  Through the early spring the paper reported nothing of 
substance in that regard.  Work on the co-operative glass factory, owned by some of the 
union workers, was duly noted when it occurred.  This included coverage of the building 
of the factory road or the arrival of new pots or furnaces.  In retrospect, reporting seemed 
overly optimistic, as co-operative ventures were usually failed.  Several weeks before the 
company bell rang for what seemed like and what would ultimately be the final time.  
The Observer noted that businesses dependent on public patronage had already taken a 
substantial loss when the company closed and the workers in the cutting and decorating 
departments ceased receiving checks.  Property values were expected to drop 
precipitously over the next half decade.  In May Western glass companies came to terms 
with the union and returned to work with higher wages that were impossible to match in 
the East.  The outlook was bleak, and in this there is no doubt that the local press 
reflected exactly how the public felt.36
When the directors voted in August 1888 to close the factory, the town was
depressed.  Over the next two months, citizens desperately tried to change the directors’ 
minds, but to no avail.  On October 1, after hearing appeals from the people of Sandwich, 
                                                
36 Yarmouth Register, February 18-March 31, 1888 and Sandwich Observer, February 21 and March 6, 
1888
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the directors unanimously voted not to reopen the factory with the old rules intact, as they 
said this would “tend to bring about a repetition of the difficulties that have been 
experienced in years past.”  Despite several more efforts to establish glassmaking in 
Sandwich, the community would never be the same.  The Boston Journal ran the 
following story and several local papers, including the Register, reprinted it:
Another of the New England Glass companies has yielded to the 
inevitable and decided to discontinue operations.  Labor troubles in the East and 
natural gas in the West, both combining to place New England at a disadvantage, 
have induced the directors of the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company to quit the 
business in which they have been engaged the last sixty years.  This is the third of 
the local companies to succumb, the Suffolk and the New England having already 
removed to the West on account of superior facilities afforded in that section.  
The directors voted Wednesday noon to wind up the affairs of the corporation, to 
cease work, and to sell off the stock and materials now on hand.  President 
Bradlee said: ‘The Manufacturers’ Association has entered into an agreement 
which it is impossible for us to live up to and make glass at a profit.’  When asked 
if the real estate in Sandwich was for sale, he replied that if anyone wanted it at a 
fair price he guessed there would no hesitation in selling.  The fact seems to be 
that the recent action of the Western Manufacturers, most of whom have no coal 
bills to pay, in agreeing to the demands of the Flint Glass Workers’ Union for 
higher pay is resulting in the loss to New England of one of its oldest and most 
honored industries.37
This quotation represents how residents of Sandwich most likely felt about the 
closing of the factory.  They believed that the Manufacturers’ Association helped put the 
company out of business by making an agreement with the union.  The Boston and 
Sandwich Glass Company and other Eastern firms were unable to pay the wages that this 
new agreement demanded and therefore had to close.  The report exemplifies the notion 
that neither the company nor the workers were to blame for the catastrophe.  Rather it 
was the AFGWU and the Western Manufacturers who were responsible.  This does not 
                                                
37 Quoted from the Boston Journal in the Yarmouth Registers, August 18, 1888
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mean that there was a conspiracy, but it does begin to point in that direction.  The sullen 
tone of the article revealed how the depressed attitude of local communities affected by 
the geographical shift of the glass industry.  Even though it was first written for a Boston 
newspaper, this article demonstrates what many citizens of Sandwich likely felt regarding 
the crisis and the shutdown of the factory.
Newspaper coverage of the Boston and Sandwich Glass Factory strike of 1888 
indicated how workers and their union were viewed by the community.  The local 
newspapers were indeed sympathetic to the employees, but mostly to non-union men and 
women.  These individuals were viewed as unwilling participants in the event; they were 
forced out of their jobs by an organization as oppressive as the company was accused of 
being.  People distrusted the union due to its national scope and because it was centered 
in distant Pittsburgh where workers had different concerns than in Sandwich.  It was 
believed that national union leaders thought of themselves first, and local conditions like 
those in Sandwich second, if at all.  This is probably for similar reasons to the public 
distrust of business monopolies such as Standard Oil, Carnegie Steel, and other giant 
trusts.  The aftermath of the strike was covered in an oddly optimistic way, almost as if 
the press was attempting to boost the morale of the public, but ultimately it was only 
misleading as the glass industry never returned to its place of prominence in the 
community.
The attitude of the local press during the strike shows that despite pre-existing 
political affiliations or beliefs about labor organizations, the community wanted the strike 
to end.  Regardless of how citizens felt about the workers themselves, the crisis was bad 
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for the whole population.  If the factory shut down, most of the glass workers would 
likely leave town to find employment elsewhere, leaving Sandwich without a large 
segment of its economic base.  That would cripple any shopkeeper or other small 
businessman who relied on the patronage of Irish glassmakers for his own financial 
survival.  Even if someone thumbed his nose at them, and many townspeople probably 
did due to ethnic and religious differences, they would have recognized that their 
continued presence was necessary for the survival of everyone else.
The Globe and Journal took distinctly pro-management angles to their stories, not 
printing any extensive interviews with strikers and not dissecting the real causes or nature 
of the labor conflict.  The Herald was much fairer in its approach, although it could 
hardly be called a labor organ.  It gave a voice to both sides in order for the people to be 
able to process the information themselves.  It is impossible to know for sure why the 
reporting was slanted in the direction it was for every press outlet, but each newspaper 
contributes to the understanding of the crisis today.
While the press coverage of the incident no doubt reflected the feelings of much 
of the community, they also influenced those feelings.  The press can be looked at as a 
curved lens that refracts light and results in a distorted image.  That image then becomes 
fixed in popular memory.  Future generations would then explain the crisis in the way it 
was told by the newspapers, rather than how people saw it as it happened.  The next 
chapter will examine how future generations remembered and wrote about the fall of the 
Boston and Sandwich Glass Company, the people who worked there, and the 
glassmakers’ union
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HOW LATER AUTHORS INTERPRETED THE CRISIS
The closing of the glass factory affected Sandwich citizens for years.  The very 
identity of their town was ripped away.  Local writers Frederick Irvin and Frank 
Chipman, both of whom penned short histories of the factory that detailed the 1888 
incident, expressed the feelings of the next generation toward the company, the workers, 
and the union.  Their versions of the story influenced Ruth Webb Lee and Harriot Buxton 
Barbour, later writers who tried to retell the story of the factory in a more academic way.  
Lee was a well-known glass collector who wrote several books on the glass pieces made 
at Sandwich.  The last book written on the company was also authored by collectors.  
These books demonstrate the long term affects of the reports surrounding the 1888 strike 
and how they influence the perception of the company and union in the popular memory 
of the town.  The authors in question helped to form the perceptions of later generations 
of Sandwich residents and observers.  Their writings are, therefore, crucial to 
understanding how the glass workers and the union were viewed in the century after the 
closing of the factory.
During the 1980s, Raymond Barlow and Joan Kaiser wrote an immense, multi-
volume work detailing the history of the company and the pieces the factory workers 
produced over the years.  Barlow and Kaiser tended to view the company as benign for 
most of its history, and certainly it is portrayed as good for the town.  The directors who 
voted to close the factory rather than compromise with the union are not given the benefit 
of the doubt, however, and they were usually portrayed as bad businessmen.  They also 
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depicted the workers sympathetically.  Some of the other authors showed them as 
depressed from years of industrial change, seemingly they were just waiting for the end 
to come.  Thus workers’ supposed indifference or shortsightedness can be viewed as a 
major reason for the decline of the company and the town.  The union took much of the 
blame from twentieth century authors, especially the national leadership.  Some authors 
suggest that Western glass manufacturers and union leaders plotted against their Eastern 
counterparts.  None of the works in question present concrete economic data regarding 
the company’s last years, making any analysis of the definitive causes of the closing 
difficult.
One of the earliest accounts of the closing of the Boston and Sandwich Glass 
factory comes from a local inhabitant named Frederick T. Irvin and appeared in 1926.  
The Story of Sandwich Glass and Glass Workers is a short, sentimental retrospective on 
the factory.  This book is important for reasons other than historical accuracy regarding 
the strike.  Writing a little more than a generation after factory’s the closing, Irvin 
represents a local voice.  His may not have been the consensus view, but certainly a great
portion of the public had similar feelings.  Irvin cites no sources other than himself and 
was not a trained historian.  Nonetheless, Irvin claimed to be “thoroughly competent” to 
write the book due to his family’s long standing in the glass industry in Cape Cod.  His 
frame of reference in the book is the general mood of the town forty years after the crisis
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and how the people of his day thought and felt about the past, including the history of the 
company, glassmaking, and the union.1  
Irvin seems to have had several purposes with this project.  First, he claimed to be 
interested in the sociological value of such a work, comparing the old days to more 
modern times.  The chief difference he saw was that prior to the advent of mass 
mechanization, glass workers viewed themselves as producing great art, but toward the 
end of the factory’s life and in the industry generally at the end of the nineteenth century, 
workers became merely automatons – living machines.  These changes occurred out of 
necessity, he believed, and if the directors had not increased mechanization and used 
press molds, then the factory would have been forced to close.  The workers resisted 
these changes, which was one reason Irvin points to for the increase in strikes in the 
1880s,and that resistance ultimately what led to the factory’s closing.2
His book was not anti-business, though, and for the most part he is not overly 
critical of workers or directors, especially given the situation, preferring to think back to 
what he considered as the town’s “good times.”  He concludes by recalling the better 
times of the factory and the people who worked there:
                                                
1 As with all the authors discussed here, the period during which Irvin wrote must also be taken into 
consideration.  The 1920s were a period marked by the dominance of business in public life.  It was also, 
however, a time when attitudes toward labor unions were changing.  The injunction, long a tool used by 
government to suppress union activity, was no longer used by the later years of the decade, and unions 
gained more legitimacy
2 Frederick T. Irvin, The Story of Sandwich Glass and Glass Workers (Manchester, NH 1926), p. 6.  For 
more on labor’s resistance to mechanization see Sean Wilentz’s work on the working class in New York 
City in during the nineteenth century in Chants Democratic.  Sandwich and the rest of the glass industry 
mechanized early on with the invention of the press, but it did not become a major for labor until the latter 
part of the century.  The lessons taken from New York may not be applicable to a great degree in this case, 
because of the differences between metropolitan and small-town life detailed by Herbert Gutman in the 
mid-twentieth century.
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The Company never allowed a payday to be passed over in the hardest 
times… No employee ever had reason to complain that he was not paid in full for 
his labor, and if in case of sickness or trouble in his family he wanted a barrel of 
flour, or ton of coal, of which the company always kept a stock to be sold to its 
employees at reasonable prices, or money to help him out, it was always 
advanced.3
Frederick Irvin characterizes the local attitude in the historiography of Sandwich 
and the glass factory that made it famous.  Almost forty years after the factory doors 
closed permanently, he managed to articulate what was probably the sentiment of most 
local residents on what the factory and its ultimate demise meant for the community.  His 
voice echoes what was seen in the press at the time of crisis, essentially refusing to blame 
the workers or the company for the incident.  In the years following the closing of the 
factory this explanation of the event seems to have become ensconced in Sandwich.
In 1938 a man who claimed to be the son and grandson of Sandwich glass makers, 
Frank W. Chipman, published a book about the factory called The Romance of Old 
Sandwich Glass.4  Written by an author who like Frederick Irvin was not trained as a 
historian, this publication contains a good deal of mis-information.5  Despite his many 
                                                
3 Ibid., pp. 92-93
4 Chipman’s book came at a time when union support reached a high point.  During the Depression, unions 
were a valued member of the New Deal Coalition that helped bring Franklin Roosevelt to power.  
Roosevelt’s agenda involved bolstering union power, as evidenced by the Wagner Act and other attempts 
by the administration to increase the legitimacy of labor organizations.  See William E. Forbath, Law and 
the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Cambridge, MA, 1991).
5 For example, the author says that the union formed “just previous to 1888,” which is patently false – there 
were workers’ protective associations in Sandwich since at least 1866, with Local 16 of the American Flint 
Glass Workers’ Union (AFGWU) being formed and chartered by the national body in 1879.  He also 
indicated that the crisis first began when the company docked a worker an amount less than one dollar.  
Chipman does not explore in any other detail than that about this supposedly catalytic event, failing to 
name the worker involved or why he was docked.  He does, however, mention that Nathaniel Bradlee, one 
of the directors, set out to settle the dispute but could not.  Bradlee died before he was able to affect any 
meaningful change.  Again, Chipman fumbles over his history, as Bradlee did not die until December 1888.  
The information for Nathaniel Bradlee’s death is found in the board of directors’ report from March 1889, 
quoted in full in Ruth Webb Lee, Sandwich Glass: the History of the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company
(Wellesley Hills, MA 1966), pp. 561-563.
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errors, Chipman’s work is meaningful because he raises several important questions.  He 
resembles his predecessor Irvin in this regard.  Stating that there was a great deal of 
confusion surrounding the circumstances of the factory closing, he noted that it was only 
after “much influence was exerted from outside” that the union formed at all.  Why 
Chipman would insist that outsiders were responsible for the formation of the union and 
the end of the company is an important question.  In a way this was a way of shifting 
responsibility for events from Sandwich citizens and glassmakers, to others, which 
doubtless reflected the local view of events; but it also reflected, as we have seen, a great 
deal of the contemporary media’s coverage of the event, which often included some 
accusation of conspiracy or agitation emanating from Pittsburgh.6
Frank Chipman came from a very important Sandwich family.  The Chipmans 
had been on Cape Cod since the very early years of the Massachusetts Bay colony.  
Major Charles Chipman was one of the town’s greatest heroes.  An officer during the 
Civil War, he died fighting the Confederate Army at Petersburgh, Virginia in 1864.  He 
was given a hero’s burial in Sandwich.  Frank had many relatives who worked in the 
glass factory, which gave a personal link to those bygone days.7
Chipman himself was a purveyor of collectible glass during the 1920s.  This is 
significant because it suggests a second reason for the writing of his book, beyond 
exploring his family history.  For if he could make the glass industry seem romantic, and 
make tourists or townspeople nostalgic for those days, he would make a tidy profit from 
it; this was likely his greatest motive.  Moreover, According to Russell Lovell, a 
                                                
6 Frank W. Chipman, The Romance of Old Sandwich Glass (Sandwich, MA 1938), pp. 143-145.
7 Russell A. Lovell, Sandwich, A Cape Cod Town (Taunton, MA, 1984) pp. 121-122, 346-348, 406
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Sandwich historian, Chipman stole a great deal of information from authors of magazine 
and newspaper articles without giving them any credit.  Even with these faults and self-
serving motives, Chipman’s book did give his readers an evocative – if overly 
romanticized and error-prone – picture of nineteenth century glassblowing and Sandwich 
in particular.8
In his book Chipman also discusses what happened after the factory closed 
permanently.  According to Chipman the moulds used to form the glass in the pressing 
machines were destroyed, though he is unclear why.  This is surprising, since glass 
moulds such as these could have been sold off to other manufacturers to reduce the 
company’s debts or, better yet, purchased by some entrepreneurial-minded director, 
worker, or salesman to start a new factory in the glass producing regions of the West.  
Certainly some companies in the region chose this latter option and became successful, 
such as the New England Glass Company of Cambridge, which moved to Toledo, Ohio, 
and became the Libbey Glass Company.  The Boston and Sandwich Glass Company, 
however, chose to fold rather than relocate.  Chipman does not address why because his 
book was not analytical to any great degree, and, like Irvin, he chose to focus on the 
positive legacy of the company, and, as his title indicates, the “romance” of the glass 
industry.9  
In 1939 Ruth Webb Lee penned Sandwich Glass: the History of the Boston and 
Sandwich Glass Company (Webb’s book was republished several times; the edition used 
for this study having been published 1966.)  Webb’s is a highly comprehensive volume, 
                                                
8 Ibid. p. 456-457
9Chipman, The Romance of Old Sandwich Glass, pp. 143-145
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although she presents no formal list of sources.  While the main focus is on different 
types of glass items produced at the factory over the years, she also gives details about 
the founding and closing of the company.  Her account is perhaps most important for its 
description of what happened to the town and the factory building after 1888 and the fact 
that she includes the 1889 directors’ report in full.  Part of that document states that the 
leadership of the national union in Pittsburgh refused to allow the workers in Sandwich to 
sign an independent agreement with management, which of course destroyed any hope of
a revival of the factory late in 1888.10
Lee was herself also a collector of old glass.  She wrote several books on the 
subject, which were designed for fellow collectors, chronicling what items were made 
over the years and how the process of glassmaking changed.  This book is much like the 
others, and its interest less the history of the company than providing some historical 
context to the collectible glass items her readers sought.  Still, Lee made some strong 
advances in the story of the 1888 strike as it relates to the Boston and Sandwich Glass 
Company.  She notes that the price of glassware had dropped since the Civil War, 
probably due to the advent and preponderance of the pressing method that allowed for 
more identical items to be made at a faster pace than the traditional blowing method.11  
She also said that in 1885 the company left its decades-old office in Boston for a smaller, 
                                                
10 Lee, Sandwich Glass,  p. 563.  Like Chipman, Lee wrote during a period of high union support among 
the American people.
11 Ibid., p. 554.  Pressing permitted the manufacturers to sell more products to a wider range of customers, 
but it also resulted in the flooding of the market, causing prices to decline.  As a result the National Flint 
and Lime Glass Association, the manufacturers’ association to which the Boston and Sandwich Glass 
Company belonged, desired an extension of the traditional summer shutdown of all glass works.  In theory 
this would counteract the prevalent market trend and raise prices.  The glassworkers’ union also desired an 
extended break.  That there should be a longer vacation during July and August was not an issue.  When 
one side proposed it, however, the other took it as an attempt to subvert the power of the other, resulting in 
friction between labor and management
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cheaper place elsewhere in the city.  She refers to this event as “the beginning of the 
end.”  During the 1880s the company had begun to borrow money to pay expenses, a sure 
sign of terminal decline.  The Pittsburgh dealers had opened showrooms in Boston and 
other Eastern cities, their men controlled the national unions, and for some years now the 
West had clearly been the dominant center of the industry. 12
Lee confirms this by reference to annual reports to the stockholders for the years 
1888 and 1889.  No documents, let alone ones as important as these, had been used by 
previous writers on the subject, not to mention that Lee brought a degree of scholarship to 
her work that her predecessors lacked.  Since these reports were released annually in 
March, the first appeared during the worst part of the strike and before the final decision 
to close had been made.  That decision was made in August 1888.  In the stockholders 
report from 1888 the directors complained that workers had been running the factory for 
the past few years, and that this was obviously unacceptable due to the economic 
situation in which the company currently found itself.  The directors claimed that the very 
act of association or unionization by the workers was the root of the problem, and if only 
they would give up their union everything would be fine.  To persuade them to abandon
the union they went so far as to offer a form of cooperative venture where the 
workingmen would have a financial stake in the company.  The document does not 
indicate how the union responded to this proposal, but we know that nothing ever came 
                                                
12 Ibid., p. 555.  While today we know it as the Midwest, most of the sources examined for this study refer 
to the western Pennsylvania and Ohio area as “the West,” so that is what we will use as well.
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of it.  All in all these documents give us a clearer picture of the how the directors viewed 
the union and their efforts to offset its power.13
Lee’s account also provides us with a clearer picture of what happened in 
Sandwich after the directors decided to close the shop.14  While Frank Chipman had 
discussed what became of the company’s molds and other property, he never went into 
detail about attempts to restart the glass industry in Sandwich.  Lee, however, notes that 
on October 17, 1889, the factory building itself was sold to the Electrical Glass 
Corporation for $20,000 cash.  The new company is not described in any great detail, nor 
the type of glass it manufactured, except that it was gone within a short time.  Lee 
indicates that several attempts were made to re-open the works after this, but none met
with success.  Curiously she does not mention the co-operative venture attempted by ten 
former employees that began even before the directors made the final decision to close 
the factory, even though she discusses a similar endeavor.  One last attempt, Lee 
                                                
13 Ibid., pp. 555-561.  
14 Some of the valuable information about this period provided by Lee includes the following: in fall 1888, 
after the directors voted to close the factory, a committee of concerned Sandwich citizens, fearing that the 
town would perish if the company followed through with its plan to shutdown, petitioned the directors to 
reconsider.  If the factory closed, the town would be ruined.  Nearly everyone in Sandwich depended on the 
glass industry either directly or indirectly because it was the only large local economic activity.  One 
committee member was Edward J. Swann, formerly head of the factory’s decorating department, who 
blames the directors for what happened in the conflict, accusing them of being unable to manage the men 
and the business effectively.  He also felt that they were giving up far too easily, saying “Glassmaking is 
not an experiment in Sandwich.  It can still be successful down here.”  Swann’s assessment of the directors 
is in line with most of what other authors have suggested.  Yet his notion that glassmaking could survive 
and thrive in Sandwich at the level it had in its glory days is probably far from the truth.  The cost of coal 
was becoming prohibitive, wood did not produce as fine a product, and the price of labor was also 
becoming more than the business could manage.  Many of the best skilled workers were going elsewhere, 
something that Harriot Buxton Barbour, author of Sandwich: the Town that Glass Built in the 1940s, would 
later note as well.
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indicates, was made in May 1907, when a Philadelphia man re-opened the factory.  But 
after only a few weeks it closed for good, never again to make glass products.15
In 1948, Harriot Buxton Barbour produced Sandwich, the Town that Glass Built; 
her book focused attention on the actions of the national union.  Writing in the late 1940s, 
Barbour presented a consensus version of the events she described, resulting in a book 
that is more biased than some of the others, especially considering the more academic 
approach she took.  A slant may be acceptable from a local writer, but historians are 
generally expected to at least maintain an air of objectivity.  The flaws in Barbour’s book 
in this regard may just be remnants from her sources.  Barbour is suspicious of the 
AFGWU, the national organizing body that served as the umbrella group over the local 
workers’ collective.  According to Barbour employees formed or joined the union for 
their own personal protection and not because they cared deeply for their counterparts in 
glass houses across the nation, but with the advent of the national union they became 
embroiled in efforts to do what was best for the most workers, not themselves.  The irony 
she points out is that it was the national union’s broad scope that ultimately doomed the 
local glass industry in Sandwich.  Barbour laments what she considers the lazy habits of 
the glass workers toward the end, commenting that Deming Jarves, the man who created 
the Sandwich works, would have been rolling in his grave if he saw the “joking, smoking 
glass blowers lolling around the factory door in the middle of a good glass day,”and who 
“seemed to work only when they pleased and have plenty of time to turn out marvelous 
                                                
15 Lee, Sandwich Glass pp. 563-568
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pieces of individual work on private order.”16  She does not present any evidence to 
justify this claim other than her own word.  Hers is a stark contrast to the portrait 
Frederick Irvin painted of the proud, hard-working glass man that twenty-two years 
before.17
Barbour lauded Superintendent Henry F. Spurr.  Specifically, she praised efforts 
to reestablish the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company as one of the preeminent 
glassmakers in the nation after he became superintendent in 1882.  In this view Barbour 
seems to take her cue from Frederick Irvin, whom she lists as a source.  Both cited his 
leadership or business skills, and lamented that Spurr’s efforts came too late to ultimately 
save the company.  According to Barbour, workers had no complaints whatsoever and no 
new benefits could be gained even if they did; rather, she says the men joined the union 
for security, arguing that during the industrial era the union provided the type of 
protection that in earlier times came from the ownership of land.18  This is a rather 
                                                
16 Harriot Buxton Barbour Barbour, Sandwich, the Town that Glass Built (Boston, 1948 p. 281
17 Ibid., p. 283, 287.  Industrialization demoralized workers, resulting in their alienation from their labor.  
They were no longer the proud artisans discussed by Irvin; rather, they had become closer to laborers 
whose skill was not as important as their ability to do the same task repeatedly every day.  At the time 
Deming Jarves led the business, he enjoyed a close relationship with all workers – he knew each by name 
and was intimately aware of their lives and family situations.  Each man felt like he was an associate of 
Jarves.  However, in the 1880s directors became more distant, visiting the factory grounds infrequently.  
This most likely occurred because the new directors only had a financial stake in the company, while Jarvis 
had a personal one as well, having built the firm from the ground up.  Workers no longer felt secure and 
safe in their positions in life.  According to Barbour, they felt that “their lives were ordered by remote 
control and were impelled to huddle together for defense against forces they could not see or comprehend –
a tendency that could lead to mass living, mass thinking, and mass dying.”  The men still managed to retain 
a modicum of pride in their labor, which was evident in the pieces they did for private orders or for family 
and friends.  Their industrial production, though, showed a “sloppy indifference” as it became more 
monotonous and less individualistic.
18 Ibid., pp. 280-282.  The town gave Spurr a gold-headed walking cane for being the most popular man in 
the community.  He was well liked by workers and directors alike.  Barbour says this is a result of his 
unique ability to relate to whatever company he is currently with, be it the board of directors in Boston or 
the glasscutters in Sandwich.  Spurr allowed the men to do as they wished in regards to output at the factory 
and their behavior.  
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contradictory argument, for she blames the workers for being lazy, but seems to give 
Spurr a pass for allowing them to do as they wished regarding output.  In fact, if Spurr 
had been the fantastic manager many accounts say he was, he should have been able to 
motivate the men adequately to work as hard on their industrial pieces as they did on 
private work.  Likewise, for much of the mid-to-late 1880s there was a labor crisis in 
Sandwich, which Barbour pays little attention to.  She is, indeed, much too willing to 
accuse the workers and the union for the local troubles without considering the possibility 
that management’s actions, or lack thereof, also contributed to the company’s problems.  
Instead while she understands the workers’ plight, she still tends to blame them for the 
downfall of the company.   While she accuses the directors of an inadequate level of 
communication with the workers, she does not seem to hold them responsible for the 
closing.  The union workers, she suggests, were lazy and ignorant, and therefore 
responsibility for the shut down fell largely on their shoulders.
One important contribution of Barbour’s book is her description of the 1882 
Window Glass Workers’ Strike in Pittsburgh and glass workers’ unions’ association with 
the Knights of Labor.  The AFGWU’s followed a similar historical path to that of the 
window workers, and the Knights of Labor not only shaped the contemporary labor 
movement, but the AGFWU had been affiliated with the Knights since the late 1870s.  
These connections, she indicates, are vital to understanding the development of the union 
and the perception the workers had of themselves, as well as how they were viewed by 
others in light of the union’s relationships with other organizations.
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The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a tumultuous time for labor, marked 
by numerous high profile strikes including the Great Strike of 1877, the 1885 and 1886 
Knights of Labor strikes against Jay Gould and his railroads in the Southwest, the steel 
strike of 1888, and the Pullman strike and boycott of 1894.  These events, and many like 
them, occurred for numerous reasons.  Chief among them were the workers’ desire to 
increase wages, fight wage cuts, protest poor working conditions, and gain union 
recognition.  These efforts reflected serious economic depressions in the 1870s and 
1890s.  Workers had little to no protection for their families if they were injured or killed 
on the job, and companies across the country were expanding at ever-increasing rates, 
putting skilled craftsmen out of work.  The glass industry was no different.19  
The 1882 Window Glass Workers’ strike was inspirational to the flint glass 
workers in Sandwich and their cohorts at other firms.  Like the AFGWU, the Window 
Glass Workers had rapidly nationalized their union over the previous few years.  In 1882, 
they struck in glass houses across the country to protest the vast wage difference between 
workers in the West (Pittsburgh-Ohio region) and the East (eastern Pennsylvania north to 
New England).  Amazingly, they won all of their demands, including a reduction in wage 
differences between the two regions, control over output, and the closed shop.20  These 
were mostly the same concerns that existed in the flint glass industry and would be issues 
for which the AFGWU would strike in 1888.  The glass workers gave credit to the 
                                                
19 Barbour, Sandwich  the Town that Glass Built p. 283
20 The closed shop refers to the idea that a factory would only hire workers who were members of the 
recognized union.  Workers’ organizations sought this reform through a number of avenues, including 
bargaining with management and outright intimidation of non-union workers. 
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organizational and supporting powers of the Knights of Labor that most prominent 
national labor organization in the United States during the 1870s and 1880s.21
The Knights of Labor was the leading labor organization in the United States 
during the Gilded Age.  While it began as a secret fraternal organization in Philadelphia 
shortly after the Civil War, it soon served more as a union.  The agenda of the Knights 
harkened back to an earlier form of unionism that focused on social reform as the cure to 
the ills of labor and society.  The main thing they fought was vast accumulation of wealth 
in the hands of the few.  Some of the remedies proposed were the formation of co-
operatives and abandonment of the wage system, under which the employer was the 
master of his employees.  The Knights, specifically its second Grand Master, Terrence 
Powderly, felt that society would be better served as a republic of small producers in 
which each man was his own employer.  Glassmakers had no interest in overthrowing the 
wage system, although several Boston and Sandwich workers did found a short-lived co-
operative glass house.  Barbour helps link the story of the Sandwich glass workers and 
the AFGWU directly to the Knights.22
Management had attempted to increase production.  Workers viewed this as 
lowering prices by flooding the market and resisted these attempts and retained control 
                                                
21 Barbour, Sandwich, the Town that Glass Built, p. 284-285.  Barbour addresses the question of who 
organized first in the glass industry, labor or management.  She concludes that most manufacturers’ 
associations were not established until after the workers started collectives on a large scale.  The window 
glass workers of Pittsburgh first joined the Knights of Labor in 1877, but the American Window Glass 
Manufacturers’ Association failed to “take stable form” until two years later.  She points to a similar time 
lapse in the flint glass industry, with the first strong national flint glass workers’ union, the AFGWU, 
forming in 1878 and their opposition, the National Flint and Lime Association, not appearing for another 
two years.  When the workers go out in 1885 and again three years later, these groups will be the main 
protagonists.
22 For more on the Knights of Labor see Gerald Grob, Workers and Utopia: A study of ideological conflict 
in the American Labor Movement, 1865-1900 (Evanston, Ill 1965), pp. 3-59 and Leon Fink, Workingmen’s 
Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics (Chicago, 1983).
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over output for much of the 1880s.  Required production consisted of only two “moves” 
every day, meaning they only sent batches to the finishing ovens two times.  Barbour 
reports that sometimes this could be completed in fewer than two hours or as many as 
twelve depending on the size of the objects being created.  The union required each 
member to be present for no fewer than four hours on any given day.  Barbour sees these 
rules or practices as indications that the glass workers at Sandwich were lazy and lacked 
a sense of reality, for according to Barbour, the company was suffering real economic 
hardships, a fact the men failed to accept in part because the directors did not properly 
inform them and in part because the historic success of the business kept them from 
realizing how dire the straits were.  In fall 1887 company leaders across the nation 
attempted to force new rules and output regulations on the men, an action which virtually 
compelled the unions to resist.23
In this conflict Barbour takes the side of the directors, but she nonetheless remains 
understanding of the workers’ point-of-view.  Like Irvin, she views the final acts of the 
directors as self-serving, morally questionable, and silly from a business standpoint.  For 
                                                
23 Barbour, Sandwich, the Town that Glass Built,  p. 288.  One of the more intriguing possible reasons for 
the agitation of workers in Sandwich is what Barbour refers to as the Nicholas Black Affair.  It began in 
April 1887, a full eight months before the workers walked out of the factory for the final time, over a 
reported 87-cent argument.  When one of Mr. Black’s moves, or the number of individual items made for a 
particular type of glassware over the course of half a day, was counted several pieces short of his quota, the 
company docked his pay.  The men who counted each move were known as sloarmen, and to blowers like 
Black they represented the interests of the company rather than those of workingmen.  Black’s fellow 
blowers backed him up when he stated that his move had been completed.  Black did not have to count his 
own pieces.  As Barbour reports, he was making saltcellars on that particular day and the quota for that 
item was around two hundred individual pieces.  A young boy called a taker-in took the pieces from the 
blower’s workstation to the lehr (finishing oven).  Barbour speculates that it is likely that the disagreement 
was the fault of one of these boys who was eager to get out of work and have some adolescent fun that day 
and had either jumped his count by accident out of excitement or deviously done so on purpose hoping that 
he would not be caught.  The blowers threatened to walk out if Black was not paid the money he felt he 
deserved.  At the time, Henry Spurr was away from the factory, but when he got back, he managed to get 
the blowers to continue working by paying Nicholas Black his 87 cents.  The conflict was over, but the 
incident only stoked the fires of distrust that had been growing over the previous years.
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while asserting their right to control their business may have been a good idea, the 
uncompromising way they went about it was not; indeed at one point, she refers to 
management’s lack of communication with the union as “irritatingly arrogant.”  But, both 
sides, she indicates, were foolish in their actions, at least in Sandwich.  The directors 
failed to communicate adequately with their employees and the workers failed to consider 
that a once strong company could actually be having real financial difficulties.  This 
balanced view of the crisis is strength of her work, in that she points out that the company 
was in dire straits at the time, and acceding to the union would have led to ruin.24
The definitive work on the subject is Joan Kaiser and Raymond Barlow’s five-
volume The Glass Industry in Sandwich, which first began appearing in the early 1980s.  
Written by prominent glass collectors, theirs is the most comprehensive work on the 
subject.  While much of it is devoted to the unique and beautiful patterns created at the 
factory, they also provide an account of the interesting history of the company and the 
people who worked there.  Volumes three and four are the most pertinent to this study as 
they deal directly with the union and the 1888 strike.  
                                                
24 Ibid p. 290-292.  In late fall 1887 the directors decided to put new rules into effect along with every other 
flint glass house in the country that would begin on January 2, 1888.  Among the rules was a wage scale for 
blowers, the highest paid workers in the factory.  In essence, the new scale amounted to a speed up by 
forcing the men to produce more items in the same amount of time they were required to work before the 
changes were to be instituted.  This was a slap in the face to the blowers, who once had been the most 
respected men in the industry because of the substantial amount of skill required to perform their jobs.  
Over the previous decades, however, they had seen their relative wages decline.  Barbour cites a statistic 
stating that wages increased 33% from 1840 until 1880, while general wages increased 62% during the 
same period.  The speed up was viewed by the men as something of a slippery slope – if they allowed this 
to go without protest, directors then would have precedence in the future for further reductions in pay or 
other affronts to the dignity of the workers.  In their minds, they could not afford to give an inch of ground 
to management, who they viewed as greedy, aloof proprietors governing from far off Boston.  The men 
viewed the company as making money hand over fist.  Barbour says that this assessment could not have 
been further from the truth – but none of the directors bothered to explain this to the workers, let alone 
show them the figures regarding how, for several years the company had been losing money.  With the 
fixed costs of transportation, materials, and fuel the only way to cut costs and attempt to remain 
competitive with the Pittsburgh dealers was to reduce labor costs.
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Barlow and Kaiser provide a detailed account of the struggles of the 1880s, 
including the workers’ efforts at unionization after the 1860s. In 1866 the first protective 
association for New England glass workers was formed.  The men were ready to join the 
national glass workers’ union when it was founded in the 1870s.  The glass workers of 
Sandwich received their AFGWU seal in April, 1879.  The seal is an interesting artifact.  
Emblazoned on it is the union motto, “Obedience to the Majority.”  The union was to 
protect the most men, which meant Western men, and everyone else be damned.  The 
best interests of certain workers were not the same as the best interests of others and they 
would not be treated as such – the seal points that out from the beginning.
 In 1873, the B&SGCo began to feel significant pressure from Pittsburgh 
manufacturers, which had the benefit of proximity to cheap natural gas that burned much 
hotter than either wood or coal and resulted in a more brilliant final product.  That year 
also saw the beginnings of what would become the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union 
in Pittsburgh.  This small event would swell into an incredibly powerful force over the 
next fifteen years.  Following the beginning of the plan to put the US on the gold standard 
in 1973, the 1870s became a rough time economically, and the glass industry was not 
immune to the downturn in prosperity.  Demand decreased and glass houses had to adapt.  
Employees in Sandwich started being let go in 1874, which eventually cost George 
Fessenden, the factory general manager, his job.  Prior to that, he attempted to improve 
employee efficiency, thus marking a notable period in the transformation of the workers 
from skilled artisans to laborers.  One of his changes was an improved method for cutting 
away excess glass while it was being shaped on a blower’s tube.  This increased 
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refinement gave an edge to Sandwich over competition, which partially negated the 
inherent inferiorities in the glass resulting from using a lesser fuel source.  Fessenden also 
enhanced line production, asking workers to become more skilled at one specific task 
instead of being able to do everything.  This lowered labor costs and allowed more 
money to be spent on fuel.25
The union gained power as business slowly improved in the 1880s.  But the 
union’s success proved both a blessing and a curse for workers. The benefits 
unionization brought included a type of sick pay that the members would give each other 
so that they could have time to recuperate; moreover if a loved one or fellow worker died,
they also received time off for funerals.  However, the increase in AFWGU power had
negative consequences as well, for the union exercised its might to intimidate non-union 
men into falling into line and used itemized lists to affect money paid and factory
productivity.  In fact the union controlled the factory to a remarkable degree, though not 
without some strife.  Barlow and Kaiser, however, blamed the board of directors for the 
sad state of affairs the Sandwich firm had come to by 1888, accusing them of being 
reactive when what the company needed was bold, proactive leadership in the face of the 
increasingly powerful union.  The workers too contributed to the downfall of the 
company, through their shortsightedness and naivety.  With stronger leadership or a more 
                                                
25 Raymond Barlow and Joan Kaiser, The Glass Industry in Sandwich Vol. 3 (Windham, NH, 1987), pp. 33-
36
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understanding, independent workers’ association they indicate, the B&SGCo might have 
had a better chance at survival.26
Beginning with Spurr’s ascendance as General Superintendent in 1882, there was 
a brief revival of the factory’s former greatness, but the period was rife with labor 
troubles.  Spurr decreased total output but increased the quality of the products made to 
try to carve out a niche in the business.  By 1883 there were three hundred workers, 
although many of those were not employed full-time.  Around this time, workers went 
out on strike, taking advantage of the sudden upswing in the fortunes of the company.  
They struck again in 1885, proving that events three years later had been brewing for a 
long time.27
On August 15, 1888, after another long and arduous labor struggle, the directors 
decided to close the factory for good and sell the works, spelling doom for the town of 
Sandwich.  As in Ruth Webb Lee’s book, Barlow and Kaiser describe how the concerned 
citizens committee desperately tried to persuade the directors reconsider.  Their version 
of these events is different however because these authors do not mention Edward 
Swann, but instead indicate that it was George T. McLaughlin who led it.  They also 
mention the results of those desperate pleas for on October 9 the board decided not to 
reopen and to get what they could for the stockholders.  Then, on November 27, 1888, the 
company evicted the workers from company housing, putting them out on the street.  A 
                                                
26 Ibid., pp. 41-43.  One of the first things Local Union 16 did as a member of the AFGWU was send 
money to striking workers in the West.  That strike resulted in more business for the Sandwich factory.  
The workers should have recognized this correlation.
27 Raymond Barlow and Joan Kaiser, The Glass Industry in Sandwich Vol. 4 (Windham, NH, 1983), pp. 3-8
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year later, the factory was sold to the Electrical Glass Corporation, and in 1894, the 
corporation was officially dissolved in state court.28
Some authors have indicated that the strike in the late 1880s was instigated by 
labor leaders from the West, which had by then far surpassed the Northeast as the center 
of the American glass industry.  If this is true, and the evidence indicates that it is, then 
we can draw a conclusion about how the Sandwich glassmakers were viewed by their 
peers in the glass industry and the leaders of the AFGWU.  In the interests of the union 
and the industry as a whole, Local Union 16 was unnecessary.  If those workers who 
comprised the local moved to Pittsburgh to work in the big factories there, more glass 
could be produced, creating greater profits for the industry and higher wages for workers.  
Some historians have pushed these conclusions ever further and suggested –
giving these events a nefarious, conspiratorial character – that the strike was agreed upon 
ahead of time by the Western labor leaders and the Western factory managers and owners 
in order to drive the Eastern glass houses out of business.  This was certainly suggested 
by the press in 1888, who did not want to blame the company or the workers.  Referring 
to the Window Glass Workers’ Strike of 1882, Barbour quotes the striking workers as 
saying, “Pittsburgh is the center of the glass trade. . . and Pittsburgh price rules the 
market throughout the land.  Therefore Pittsburgh brothers must have control of all the 
glass workers of America.”29  This comment applied equally to the situation in Sandwich 
and the flint glass trade.  By the time of crisis in 1888, the Pittsburgh glass houses had 
been able to open showrooms in Eastern cities such as Boston and compete effectively 
                                                
28 Ibid., pp. 16-20
29 Barbour, Sandwich, the Town that Glass Built, p. 285
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with local manufacturers, and they understood the benefits they would receive if an entire 
set of competing firms went out of business.  They had learned this during the 1885 strike 
in the East.  
Ruth Webb Lee also provides information supporting the idea of a conspiracy, 
although she does not comment on it.  The evidence in questions appears in the 1889 
stockholders report reprinted in her book.  Her purpose in including the report in her book 
was to show the state of affairs for the company during the strike, and why the directors 
believed the company folded in the face of the latest labor dispute.  The report indicated
that a “high official of the Glass Makers’ Union” objected to the Sandwich workers 
signing off on rules submitted by the directors, which the men themselves were willing to 
do.  While the report’s claim cannot be accepted without question, given the source, it 
does fit into a pattern of instigation from the West.  Whatever the details and motives, 
there was definitely interaction between the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company 
directors and the high-level officials of the AFGWU.  Ruth Webb Lee herself does not 
discuss whether it was nefarious or benign.30
The pressure from Western union leaders is not the only possible explanation for 
the strike of 1888, nor for any of its predecessors.  There were obviously other issues in 
play during the period, including wage levels, working conditions, control of output, the 
apprentice system, and the closed-shop movement.  Numerous workers in the Sandwich 
glass house felt that the only way to realize these goals and achieve a general state of
security for themselves and for the community was through collective action.  According 
                                                
30 Lee, Sandwich Glass, pp. 559-563 and Barbour, Sandwich, the Town that Glass Built, p. 300
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to Barbour, some workers disagreed and looked upon the union with great mistrust.  
These men prized liberty over safety and viewed the union, especially after it associated 
with the AFGWU nationally, as too big and demanding – potentially as dangerous and 
oppressively controlling as the owners.  Men who thought this way and refused to join 
the union were considered by labor leaders to be threats to the movement and the union 
endeavored through intimidation to compel every eligible worker to join and toe the 
line.31
The national union assessed fees to assist striking workers across the country.  
Barlow and Kaiser point out, however, that the union was seen by some workers as 
another oppressive force.  But the two men in charge of business, George Fessenden and 
his brother Sewall, refused to stand up to either the union or the board of directors; 
perhaps if they had, the fate of the company could have been different.  For Kaiser and 
Barlow point out that only those Eastern houses with unique and original ideas survived,
such as the Mt. Washington Glass Company, Union Glass Company, and New England 
Glass Works.  The B&SGCo had no such plans, and no men to implement them and 
while generally, Superintendent Henry Spurr is credited with being such a person, he 
came into power only in 1882, too late to avert disaster as by that time, the company was 
                                                
31 Barbour, p. 287-288.  Barbour points to a German immigrant, Fred Wodt, who refused to join the 
organization and expressed a fear for his very life and wellbeing.  Another anti-union advocate was Billy 
Kern, who had left the Sandwich works for New Bedford, Massachusetts.  He felt that the glass houses of 
the East were losing ground to the West due to poor union management.  He believed that the AFGWU was 
too rigid on a national scale, and failed to consider local conditions.  Keeping such men from even working 
in the factory would prevent any propaganda from infiltrating the shop floor, thus weakening the strength 
of the workers’ movement.  It would also prevent the union members themselves from having to resort to 
intimidation tactics.
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only employing 75 full-time workers working at full capacity, a far cry from the several 
hundred in previous years.32
The 1888 strike was not the first time the union was accused of forcing workers to 
strike against their will.  In 1883, glass workers went out on strike.  Barlow and Kaiser 
put responsibility for that crisis at the feet of the union, saying that the workers were 
“forced out of work by the union’s directive.”33  The company, empathizing with its 
employees, hired some of the out-of-work men to repaint some buildings, including 
company-owned employee housing.  In the fall of 1885, the workers again went out on 
strike in the first glass strike that touched workers in many different states.  Forty-three 
men had walked out of the factory on October 12, and the following evening there was a 
meeting to discuss conditions at the works.  Three days later all Eastern glass workers 
were on strike.  Union men broke up work teams and forced non-union workers to join 
the strike.  Although it represented only one-third of the total workforce, the union 
compelled most of the laborers to abandon work.
The issues in the strike in 1885 were typical: wages, productivity, and working 
conditions.  Management refused to accede to the union’s demands, and the glass 
furnaces were closed on October 19.  The board of directors was made up of “Boston 
based men” and therefore had a difficult time understanding the complaints of the 
workers; or they also did not fully understand how the strike was affecting not just the 
workers, but their families and the other townspeople as well.34  On November 11, 1885, 
                                                
32 Barlow and Kaiser, Vol. 3, p. 41-43
33 Barlow and Kaiser, Vol. 4, p. 4
34 Ibid., p. 8
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Henry Spurr announced that the strike had been broken, but Barlow and Kaiser indicate it 
was really more of a settlement.  The strikers were hurt more than the company and
forced to compromise on their demands.  During this strike, the Western glass houses 
first felt what it would be like if their Eastern counterparts all stopped making glass, and 
it felt good.35
Following the strike Spurr attended the National Convention of Glass 
Manufacturers.  At this gathering, it was decided to pass a resolution stating that if any 
one factory’s workers went on strike, every other factory would lock out theirs, hoping to 
wreak havoc on the union by preventing extra money from being sent from working 
workers to idle ones.  This greatly disturbed Spurr, who had risen to his place of power 
after years as an employee; after all, he had been one of the best salesmen the company 
ever had.  This resolution could also be seen as evidence – certainly it fuels the theory –
that workers and owners alike from Pittsburgh effectively collaborated on the strike in 
1888 to force the glass houses of the East out of business for good.36  In their account of
the years prior to the strike, Barlow and Kaiser detail how the mutual admiration that had 
previously characterized workforce and management turned to ill will; they also stated 
that for some time representatives from the union offices in Pittsburgh had been coming 
to Sandwich to “agitate Sandwich glass workers over the poor working conditions in 
Pittsburgh glass houses,” and thus, by taking advantage of a natural empathy with their 
fellow workers, turned the Sandwich workers against their own best interests.37  
                                                
35 Ibid., pp. 3-8
36 Ibid., p. 10
37 Ibid., p. 11
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On November 27, 1887 glassworkers in Pittsburgh decided to go out on strike.  If 
this occurred, every glass house was resolved to lock out its own workers per the 
agreement made two years earlier.  As it turned out, that date passed without a strike, but 
the owners were still on notice.  In response, the manufacturers’ association issued new 
rules to be posted at the beginning of the year.  The AFGWU found the list objectionable 
and threatened to strike in 1888 unless the offending rules were changed.  Barlow and 
Kaiser conclude that Pittsburgh workers and owners did in fact collude in this incident to 
ruin Eastern factories and bring the West to complete domination.  They would have 
known that the new list of rules would not pass muster with the union men in many cities 
and towns and that the result would be a nationwide strike/lockout.  Furthermore, they 
knew that the Pittsburgh glass houses could survive longer than those in the East, and that 
when all was said and done they would come out triumphant – all of them, Pittsburgh 
workers and owners alike.38
  There were some local reasons to get behind union action, however.  There was 
some labor trouble in the cutting department early in 1887 (The Nicholas Black Affair 
discussed by Barbour), forcing a meeting between Henry Spurr and William J. Smith, 
President of the AFGWU in April.  At the same time, there had been a fire on Cape Cod 
that destroyed 25,000 acres of timber, which put an unexpected burden on the company
since wood was the fuel that the factory used to make glass and without it coal or some 
                                                
38 Barlow and Kaiser, Vol. 4, pp. 11-14
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other energy source would have to be imported at high expense to Sandwich, having an 
adverse affect on the wages of the men.39  
These facts are known.  But without a smoking gun, it is impossible to say 
definitively whether there was a Western “conspiracy” to put Eastern glass manufacturers 
out of business.  Certainly, some workers and management believed this to the case.  
Union leaders from the West did go to Sandwich and other firms to agitate for the union, 
but agitation is not necessarily a sign of a nefarious plot.  As it stands, the issue is not 
decided.  However, Sandwich is not the only factory where it has been speculated fell 
prey to such a conspiracy.  Lura Woodside Watkins, writing in 1930 about the New 
England Glass Company in Cambridge, said the strikes there were “instigated by the 
western members of the Glassmaker’s Union, tacitly supported by the western 
manufacturers.”40  She says they supported the action because the interests of the western 
companies were furthered by the strike.  Such evidence is mostly circumstantial and 
anecdotal – reports from local workers and the directors – but it does appear that the 
AFWGU instigated the nationwide strike with implicit support from Western 
manufacturers who hoped the crisis would result in the abandonment New England and 
New York as centers of glass production.  Whatever the motive, this is what in fact
happened, and the shift that had begun after the Civil War was now complete.  After 1888 
the center of the American glass industry was Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and later Toledo, 
Ohio and Corning, New York.
                                                
39 During the last few years of the factory, the company vacillated between using wood and coal as its main 
energy source, and the fire forced it back to the more expensive option.
40 Lura Woodside Watkins, Cambridge Glass (Boston, 1930) p. 37
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CONCLUSION
The Sandwich glassmakers formed their union for protection against the forces of 
industrialization in the late nineteenth century.  That is why they joined regional and 
national organizations.  In the end no association could save them as the Boston and 
Sandwich Glass Company could not survive in the contemporary world of glass 
manufacturing.  The company did not have access to cheap fuel, nor did it have a capable 
board of directors willing to move the company elsewhere.  The workers themselves 
could not fathom that the once proud and powerful firm was struggling to stay in 
business, and the American Flint Glass Workers’ Union that was supposed to protect 
them did nothing to alleviate their problems.  When the company and the workers were 
willing to compromise in fall 1888, the national union leadership did not give its 
approval, and the deal died, and so did the company.
Some of the workers, still viewing themselves as individual craftsmen, and 
hoping to create a better situation for themselves, attempted to keep the glass industry in 
Sandwich alive by forming a co-operative factory.  The Co-operative Glass Company 
(CGC) survived for three years before all references to it disappeared and its founders 
went their separate ways, relegated to the status of wage earners in Philadelphia or 
Pittsburgh.  The CGC fell victim to the ills of many other co-operative ventures, but 
mostly the problem was a lack of available capital.  Prominent community members 
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donated cash, and the ten founders of the company put everything they had into it, but in 
the end they lost their life savings.41
The CGC was not the final attempt to revive the glass industry in Sandwich.  On 
several occasions, others would try, sometimes under the old Boston and Sandwich name.  
The co-operative, however, was the last gasp of reformist unionism, the ideology that 
drove the Knights of Labor and Terrence Powderly.  Thinking the nation would be better 
off as a republic of small producers, the founders of the company insisted that all workers 
own stock, and that all stockholders work.  That agenda did not represent all of the 
former employees of the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company, as others moved South 
and West to find new jobs in other factories that had survived the labor crisis.
Despite their distrust of the AFGWU, townspeople supported the ten union 
members in their enterprise.  After all, they were longstanding members of the 
community, and they needed support if they were to revitalize the glass industry. The 
press covered the CGC optimistically, hoping that somehow the industry and town could 
make a joint recovery.  But this was not to be, and by 1891 all references to the company 
had vanished from newspapers.
Looking back on what Sandwich used to be later authors wrote of the glass 
workers as hard working, valuable members of the community and argued that.  It was 
only when the AFGWU arrived that things started turning sour.  This was not the truth, 
                                                
41 Jon and Jacqueline Wetz, The Co-operative Glass Company, Sandwich, Massachusetts: 1888-1891
(Sandwich, MA, 1976) and Joseph G. Knapp, The Rise of American Cooperative Enterprise, 1620-1920
(Danville, IL, 1969), particularly the first section, “Probings.”  Also see the classic work on co-operative 
exchange system in Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Revolt: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in 
America (New York, 1978).  Goodwyn sees the co-operative movement as the essential element of true 
populism, and speaks on the topic a great deal.
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but how Sandwich remembered the incident.  It was how the press had reported the 
incident when it happened, though whether that was how most people felt at the time
cannot be said.  Nonetheless that version of events became lodged in the memory of the 
town, and future generations accepted the story as factual.  They could not bring 
themselves to blame the company that brought the town to prominence or the local 
workers had caused the factory’s demise, so the notion that “outside forces” bore most of 
the responsibility for the company’s downfall and the exodus of workers took hold.  
The history of Sandwich represents an addition to the story of industrialization in 
nineteenth century America.  The town thrived during that period because of the glass 
industry, much as other New England towns were strengthened by the shoe or textile 
industries.  But Lynn, Lowell, Oxford, and other such places tended to be supported by 
multiple factories.  This enabled them to withstand changes slightly better than Sandwich 
could.  It remains for a comparative study to be done, showing the similarities and 
differences between Sandwich and one of these other areas after the dominant industry 
left for greener pastures.  Today the site of the Boston and Sandwich Glass Company’s 
factory in Sandwich is occupied by the Sandwich Glass Museum.  The people of 
Sandwich have embraced their history as a center of glass production, even though it 
existed there for fewer than seventy years.  The industry is remembered affectionately, 
the community focusing on the positive aspects of the industry rather than on the 
wrenching economic pain the loss of the company created. This romanticized view of 
Sandwich’s past is due in part, maybe in large part, to the collectable quality of glass the 
town produced, which inspired many of those who have written about Sandwich as it is 
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today the source of tourism.  By playing down the tumultuous nature of the end of the 
company, the town thus maintains a mystique that attracts collectors and tourists, but is 
not the town’s true history.
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